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Stucture and Feedback in Cloud Service API Fuzzing
Evangelos Atlidakis
Over the last decade, we have witnessed an explosion in cloud services for hosting
software applications (Software-as-a-Service), for building distributed services (Platform-
as-a-Service), and for providing general computing infrastructure (Infrastructure-as-a-
Service). Today, most cloud services are programmatically accessed through Applica-
tion Programming Interfaces (APIs) that follow the REpresentational State Trans-
fer (REST) software architectural style and cloud service developers use interface-
description languages to describe and document their services. My thesis is that we
can leverage the structured usage of cloud services through REST APIs and feedback
obtained during interaction with such services in order to build systems that test cloud
services in an automatic, efficient, and learning-based way through their APIs.
In this dissertation, I introduce stateful REST API fuzzing and describe its imple-
mentation in RESTler: the first stateful REST API fuzzing system. Stateful means
that RESTler attempts to explore latent service states that are reachable only with
sequences of multiple interdependent API requests. I then describe how stateful REST
API fuzzing can be extended with active property checkers that test for violations of
desirable REST API security properties. Finally, I introduce Pythia, a new fuzzing
system that augments stateful REST API fuzzing with coverage-guided feedback and
learning-based mutations.
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Over the last decade, we have witnessed an explosion in cloud services for hosting soft-
ware applications (Software-as-a-Service), for building distributed services (Platform-
as-a-Service), and for providing general computing infrastructure (Infrastructure-as-
a-Service). Thousands of new cloud services have been deployed by cloud platform
providers, such as Amazon Web Services [10], Google Cloud [22], and Microsoft Azure [12],
and support customers who are modernizing their processes by switching from the com-
plexity of owning and maintaining their own, on-premise Information Technology (IT)
infrastructure to instead simply access and pay on demand cutting edge technologies.
According to a recent study, in 2020, the public cloud services market is expected to
reach around 266 billion U.S. dollars in size and by 2022, its market revenue is forecast
to exceed 350 billion U.S. dollars [18].
Today, most cloud services are programmatically accessed by third-party appli-
cations [38] and other services [143] through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
that follow the REpresentational State Transfer (REST) software architectural style [84].
Cloud services that conform to the REST architectural style are called RESTful cloud
services and their APIs are called REST APIs. REST APIs are implemented on top of
the ubiquitous HTTP and HTTPS protocols, and provide requesting systems (clients)
with a uniform and predefined set of stateless operations in order to create, monitor,
manage, and delete cloud resources. By using a predefined set of stateless operations,
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RESTful cloud services aim for fast performance and the ability to grow by reusing com-
ponents that can be managed and updated without affecting the system as a whole.
Lately, RESTful cloud service developers use interface-description languages to
describe and document their services. Interface-description languages, such as the
OpenAPI Specification (OAS) [29], provide an implementation-agnostic way to describe
how a client can access a cloud service through its REST API, including what re-
quests the service can handle through its REST API and the format of those requests,
what responses may be received, and the respective response format [13;23;11]. Interface-
description languages can be used by documentation generation tools to describe cloud
service APIs and to automatically generate sample client code for testing purposes.
The fact that the vast majority of cloud services are accessed through REST APIs
that are well-documented with interface-specification languages presents a unique op-
portunity to build systems that automatically test cloud services through their APIs.
When is a RESTful cloud service reliable and secure to be publicly deployed? What
kinds of software errors may be hiding behind REST APIs? And how critical these
errors may be? Automatically answering such questions for production-scale, cloud
services still remains an open research challenge and is of paramount importance in
a multibillion-dollar market where competing cloud providers seek to avoid reliability
and security incidents that will attract negative publicity.
Indeed, despite the rapidly evolving cloud ecosystem, systems for automatically
testing cloud services through their REST APIs are still in their infancy. The most
sophisticated testing systems currently available for REST APIs capture live API traf-
fic, and then fuzz and replay the recorded traffic with the hope of finding software
errors [8;34;6]. Since these fuzzing systems do not explicitly capture API request depen-
dencies when generating new test cases, unfortunately, end up testing shallow service
states reached by individual API requests and fail to uncover errors that require se-
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quences of multiple API requests in order to be exposed.
Thesis. My thesis is that we can leverage the structured usage of cloud services through
REST APIs and feedback obtained during interaction in order to build systems that test
cloud services in an automatic, efficient, and learning-based way through their APIs.
My dissertation describes systems that are automatic in that they require minimal
manual intervention to test target cloud services; efficient in that they find within
a reasonable time-frame (e.g., in few hours) previously-unknown software errors that
were beyond the reach of past systems; and learning-based in that they learn without
predefined rules or heuristics how to test target cloud services. Test automation is
achieved by leveraging the common structure present in the ecosystem of cloud services
that are accessed through well-documented REST APIs. Efficiency is achieved by
careful consideration of the semantics of the RESTful architectural design style, which
allows to generate test sequences that consist of multiple API requests and test target
services deeply, and by utilizing feedback obtained from the target services during
testing in order to prune large search spaces. Finally, the systems described in my
dissertation pursue the avenue of learning-based program analysis in order to learn
from past tests common usage patterns of target cloud services and generate new tests.
Chapter 3 describes RESTler, the first stateful REST API fuzzing system. Stateful
REST API fuzzing is the cornerstone of this dissertation. Stateful means that RESTler
attempts to explore latent service states which are reachable only with sequences of
multiple API requests. Unlike past REST API testing systems that issue individual
API requests and test shallow service states, RESTler performs a lightweight static
analysis on the target cloud service API specification and infers dependencies among
API requests (e.g., inferring that a resource included in the response of a request A
is necessary as input argument of another request B). RESTler then generates test
cases that consist of multiple interdependent API requests and thoroughly test the
3
corresponding cloud service. Experimental evaluation shows that RESTler is efficient
in testing production-scale open-source and proprietary cloud services: RESTler has
found tens of previously-unknown software errors (unhandled exceptions detected as
“500 Internal Server Errors”) that have all been fixed.
Chapter 4 describes how stateful REST API fuzzing can be extended to capture er-
rors beyond unhandled exceptions. It introduces four security rules that define desirable
properties of cloud services and describes the implementation of active property check-
ers that generate API request sequences to specifically test for violations of these rules.
By construction, active property checkers can find security rule violations beyond “500
Internal Server Errors” that can be detected by baseline stateful REST API fuzzing.
Experimental evaluation shows that these checkers can report previously-unknown er-
rors in production Azure and Office-365 [28] cloud services.
Finally, Chapter 5 describes Pythia, a new fuzzing system that augments state-
ful REST API fuzzing with coverage-guided feedback and learning-based mutations.
In baseline stateful REST API fuzzing, the automatically-generated fuzzing rules in-
clude few, predefined values for each primitive type in order to limit the combinatorial
explosion of the possible fuzzing rules and values. These values remain static over
time and lead to many redundant test cases (i.e., exercising identical functionality),
which are also not prioritized in any way. Pythia augments stateful REST API fuzzing
with learning-based mutations and coverage-guided feedback. Pythia uses a statisti-
cal model to learn common usage patterns of target cloud service APIs from seed test
cases, and then generates new test cases with learning-based mutations. Additionally,
coverage-guided feedback helps prioritize the test cases that are more likely to increase
coverage coverage and find errors. Experimental evaluation shows that Pythia can
report previously-unknown errors on production-scale open-source cloud services that




The theme of this dissertation is testing of cloud services using fuzzing. Testing is a pro-
cess used “to show the presence, not the absence, of software errors” [79] and. Therefore,
software verification approaches using formal methods to prove the correctness of soft-
ware with respect to a certain formal specification or property [126;155;72;74;71;49;96;180;181;139]
are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, the focus is on dynamic test input
generation using fuzzing. Fuzzing [171] means automatic test input generation and ex-
ecution with the goal of finding security vulnerabilities. Approaches based on static
program analysis that automatically inspect source code and flag unexpected code pat-
terns [82;85;83;60;114;113] are also orthogonal to the material presented in this dissertation,
which relates to dynamic test input generation.
In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss the broader literature of test input
generation approaches using fuzzing (Chapter 2.1), symbolic execution (Chapter 2.2),
model-based testing (Chapter 2.3), and combinatorial test generation (Chapter 2.4).
2.1 Fuzzing
Traditionally, fuzzing has been used—with great success [4]—to test input-parsing pro-
grams written in low-level languages, such as C and C++. This dissertation is the first
to introduce systems that use fuzzing to test complex distributed applications, such
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as cloud services, through their APIs in a stateful manner (i.e., by constructing tests
with multiple interdependent API requests instead of individual API requests that test
shallow service states.)
Conceptually, there are two main perspectives to categorize fuzzing approaches:
based on how (and if) they use feedback from the target under test (e.g., in the form
of code coverage or status codes returned) and based on how they generate new test
inputs (e.g., by alternations of well-formed inputs or by using domain-specific rules).
First, based on how feedback from the fuzzing target is being used, there is blackbox
fuzzing, greybox fuzzing, and fully whitebox fuzzing. Second, based on how new inputs
are being generated, there is random fuzzing, mutation-based fuzzing, and grammar-
based fuzzing. Additionally, there are various combinations of the above approaches,
some of which have also been augmented with learning-based capabilities.
Blackbox Fuzzing
Blackbox is the simplest appoach to fuzzing. A blackbox fuzzer is a client program
which generates test inputs for a target program without any insight regarding the
target’s internal program structure. In that sense, the fuzzer treats the target under test
as a “black box” which may only be monitored by a diagnostic tool [9;142;51;7] that could
detect memory corruption errors (e.g., access violation exceptions and extreme memory
consumption) when executing test inputs. The literature discussed in the remainder
of this section includes random, mutation-based, grammar-based, and learning-based
blackbox fuzzing.
Random Blackbox Fuzzing
The term “fuzzing” was originally introduced by Miller et al. in 1990 to refer to a
client program that “generates a stream of random characters to be consumed by a
6
target program.” [136] One of the authors, while logged on to his workstation through
a dial-up line, noticed that the rain had affected the phone lines leading to spurious
characters which were causing basic operating systems utilities to crash (“core dump”).
This observation motivated Miller et al. [136] to conduct a systematic testing on 90 utility
programs, running on seven versions of the UNIX operating system [162], using what,
today, is commonly referred to as random blackbox fuzzing.
The basic components involved in random blackbox fuzzing have remained largely
unchanged until today, and include a module that generates random test inputs and a
module that executes these test inputs on the target and identifies potential crashes.
Miller et al.’s testing uncovered errors in 24% of UNIX utility programs, including errors
in versions of UNIX that had underwent commercial product testing.
Since then, fuzzing has become standard in the software development life-cycle and
is required at every untrusted public interface of commercial products [111]. Despite its
simplicity and its ease of adoption, random blackbox fuzzing has limited effectiveness.
For instance, a trivial program with a 32-bit integer input, which is examined in a
conditional, and when a specific value is supplied the taken branch triggers a memory
exception error. Randomly generating the specific value that will uncover the error
requires approximately 232 trials. This trivial example highlights the main caveat of
random blackbox fuzzing: random test input generation produces too many redundant
test cases that exercise the same code paths without uncovering any errors. Mutation-
based blackbox fuzzing has evolved as a promising alternative to harness this limitation.
Mutation-based Blackbox Fuzzing
In mutation-based blackbox fuzzing, an initial set of well-formed inputs, called seeds, is
used for alternations, called mutations, which leads to new test inputs, called mutants.
HTTP-fuzzers like Burp [16], AppSpider [8], Qualys’ WAS [34], and others [36;6], are
representative examples of mutation-based blackbox fuzzers. These tools capture, and
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then randomly fuzz and replay HTTP traffic, hoping to find errors. Since all these tools
use well-formed input seeds (live traffic) in order to produce new mutants, the new test
inputs are relatively well-formed (instead of completely random). Hence, mutation-
based blackbox fuzzing approaches have a higher probability to exercise a more varied
set of code paths and find unexpected errors.
However, when testing programs that process structured, non-binary input formats,
such as XML parsers [37], language compilers or interpreters [17;21;33], and cloud service
APIs [13;23;11], the effectiveness of mutation-based fuzzing techniques (blackbox, greybox,
or whitebox) is typically limited, and grammar-based fuzzing is a better alternative.
Grammar-based Blackbox Fuzzing
In grammar-based blackbox fuzzing, new test inputs are generated according to a gram-
mar which describes the format of a target input domain. The use of input grammars for
test case generation is not a new idea. In fact, it can be traced back to the 70s [107;133;154]
and the use of Context-Free Grammars (CFG). Test generation from a grammar is usu-
ally either done using random traversals of the production rules of the grammar [107] or
is exhaustive and covers all available production rules [121].
Today, the grammars used are not necessarily CFGs; yet, the basic idea remains
the same since the 70s: grammar rules describe how to generate new test inputs that
conform to a domain-specific format. Such test inputs satisfy complex structural con-
straints and exercise deep code paths because they are not rejected, early on, by syntac-
tic lexers and semantic checkers. Typical examples of blackbox grammar-based fuzzers
are HTTP testing tools, such as Sulley [35;15], Peach [2], and SPIKE [3]; network protocol
testing tools such as Quivid [42], the PROTOS Test-Suite [32], and the Yagg test gen-
erator [77]; and URL parser testing tools [140]. In all these tools, sequences of messages
are fed to the application under test and the user provides a grammar specifying the
desired request format, what parts of each request are to be fuzzed, and with what
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values.
The main caveat of grammar-based blackbox fuzzing is that the compilation of
a domain-specific fuzzing grammars is usually a non-trivial manual task. Recently,
grammar-based fuzzing has been automated in the domain of cloud service API testing
by RESTler [44;46] (described in Chapter 3). RESTler processes a REST API specifi-
cation and automatically compiles a grammar describing how to test a target cloud
service through its REST API. However, unlike REST APIs that are well-documented
with interface-specification languages, in input domains where no specification is avail-
able, or where the specification is not machine-interpretable, automatically producing
such fuzzing grammars is still infeasible. For instance, the Portable Document Format
(PDF) input format is described in a 1, 300−pages document [30] and automatically de-
riving a fuzzing grammar is unrealistic. In such domains, learning-based approaches
that learn how model a target input domain from corpora of existing test inputs have
been shown more applicable.
Learning-based Blackbox Fuzzing
Given a testing target which processes inputs from a domain D (usually non-binary,
structured input domain such as XML, PDF, or JavaScript), the main idea of learning-
based blackbox fuzzing is two-fold: first, use a modelM to approximate the structure
of the target input domain D; and then, sample the learnt modelM to obtain new test
inputs which are further alternated with mutations and then executed on the testing
target, hoping to uncover unknown errors.
The models used are usually either formal grammars, such as CFGs, or statistical
models, such as Recurrent Neural Networks [67;170]. In GLADE [50], the authors use
an two-step algorithm involving a set of heuristic rules and counterexamples [41] to
query a target program and incrementally built an oracle describing acceptable XML
input formats. Ultimately, they synthesize a set of CFG rules. Godefroid et al. [102]
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investigated the use generative RNNs [67;170] to model valid PDF formats. In Skyfire [177],
the authors mine open-source repositories in order to compile Probabilistic Context
Sensitive Grammars (PCSG) describing valid input formats for XML and JavaScript
language interpreters.
All these blackbox learning-based approaches loosely relate to RESTler [44] (dis-
cussed in Chapter 3) since RESTler also follows an automatic process to learn from
past tests how to prune invalid request sequences by analyzing service responses at
specific states. However, the way RESTler utilizes service feedback more closely re-
lates to feedback-directed test case generation [147;87;5] rather than to the learning-based
approaches which model input domains.
Overall, the key benefit of blackbox fuzzing is its ease of adoption since there is
no requirement for target source code availability. Moreover, grammar-based blackbox
approaches have been shown effective in uncovering non-trivial errors in domains with
complex input structure. However, the main questions that remain unanswered when
using blackbox fuzzing are: (i) how much fuzzing is enough? and (ii) how can one steer
the search towards test inputs that are more likely to trigger errors? Both limitations
emanate from the fact that blackbox testing is completely agnostic to the internal
program structure of the testing target. Greybox approaches discussed next attempt
to address some of these limitations.
Greybox Fuzzing
In greybox fuzzing, the testing target is not perceived as a complete “black box.”.
Instead, there is some insight regarding the target’s internal structure, usually in the
form of code coverage feedback. The conventional wisdom is that if feedback is used
to steer the search towards test cases that increase code coverage, this will increase the
likelihood of uncovering unknown errors.
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In principal, in greybox fuzzing, test case generation can be viewed as a search and
optimization problem [134;73] (e.g., with respect to code coverage). Various heuristics
and search techniques have been proposed and investigated for similar seach and opti-
mization problems, including the “Hill Climbing“ search algorithm [163], the “Simulated
Annealing” search algorithm [118], and evolutionary algorithms [137;48;103;150;119] which are
the foundation of greybox mutation-based fuzzing.
Mutation-based Greybox Fuzzing
American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) [20] and LibFuzzer [25] are representative candidates of mutation-
based greybox fuzzing. These tool require source code availability in order to perform a
light-weight static analysis and instrument the fuzzing target to produce code coverage
information. During fuzzing, test inputs that produce execution traces with unseen
code paths are preserved and routed for further mutations; while inputs that do not
trigger new execution traces are discarded. This is an evolutionary search trying to
optimize (increase) code coverage without any computationally intensive comparisons.
Such tools are very successful and have found hundreds of CVEs [4] domains with rel-
ative simple input formats, such as audio, image, or video processing applications [24;26;27],
ELF parsers [19], and binary utilities [14]. However, as explained earlier, when testing ap-
plications with complex inputs the effectiveness of mutation-based fuzzing techniques
is limited and grammar-based fuzzing is preferable.
Grammar-based Greybox Fuzzing
In grammar-based greybox fuzzing, the new test inputs adhere to some domain-specific
structure and, in addition, feedback is used to steer the search towards inputs that
increase code coverage.
Greybox grammar-based fuzzers, like Superion [178] and AFLSmart [152], combine
code coverage feedback and domain-aware heuristics that assert syntactic validity of
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new test inputs, or allow the user to define domain-aware fuzzing rules [149], or perform
mutation of the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) level of test cases [127]. Alternatively,
Zent [148], uses code coverage feedback to guide grammar-based testing tools [70;167] for
XML and JavaScript interpreters.
The main strength of grammar-based greybox tools is that, due to domain aware-
ness, they can generate highly-structured inputs that go beyond syntax parsing and
semantic checking and, at the same time, code coverage feedback helps prioritize test
inputs that are more likely to uncover errors hidden in the implementation of core ap-
plication logic. Like the above tools, Pythia (discussed in Chapter 5) also uses code
coverage feedback to guide its search. However, unlike these tools that depend on user-
provided domain rules, Pythia uses a statistical model to learn common usage patterns
of target REST APIs from seed inputs.
Learning-based Greybox Fuzzing
Learning-based greybox fuzzing approaches [53;157;166;144;123;122] use machine learning to
automatically model various program properties. The key benefit is that, such ap-
proaches, can automatically identify latent patterns [52] without domain-specific rules.
NEUZZ [166] uses feed-forward neural networks to model the branching behaviour
of a target program given a corpus of seed inputs, and then leverages the gradients of
the learn representation to mutate only a small subset of input locations that mostly
affect target branches. A relevant approach, from Rajpal et al. [157], uses an RNN
to predict mutations that are more likely to increase code coverage and select them
while vetoing redundant ones. Similarly, AFLFast [53] and uses a Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) to model the probability that mutating a certain seed will lead to new inputs
that exercise a certain code path. With this information, AFLFast gravitates its search
towards mutations that exercise less common paths and avoids generating redundant
new inputs that repeatedly exercise the same “frequent” paths.
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Nichols et el. [144] investigated the use of Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [104]
to produce a diverse set of seeds which was, in turn, given to AFL for better code
coverage. Similarly, Le et al. [122] used Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods [115] to
promote diverse programs to more thoroughly exercise compilers. Finally, AFLNet [153]
is a greybox fuzzer for network protocol implementations which learns from recorded
server-client message exchanges variations that are effective at increasing the coverage.
All the above approaches relate to the material discussed in Chapter 5, where a
statistical model is used to learn common usage patterns of target REST APIs from
seed inputs. In general, learning-based approaches have at their core an inherent tension
between learning and fuzzing which influences various design choices. On the one hand,
the purpose of “learning” is to approximate as well as possible observed behaviours.
While, on the other hand, the purpose of “fuzzing” is to confuse as much as possible,
hoping to trigger unexpected, erroneous behaviours.
Whitebox Fuzzing
All the blackbox and greybox approaches discussed so far are easy to adopt and impose
a relatively low performance overhead. However, when testing complex programs that
process very long inputs and execute millions, or even billions, of instructions [55], simple
code coverage feedback is not sufficient to guide the search towards test cases that will
uncover errors. In such cases, more sophisticated program analysis techniques, such
as dynamic taint analysis, symbolic execution, and constraint solving, are leveraged to
improve test case generation precision.
The approaches discussed in this subsection are called whitebox because they utilize
insights obtained from the testing target and convert a black box (or a grey box) into a
white box. Furthermore, they borrow ideas from fuzzing (e.g., operate on well-formed
initial inputs). Thus, we put them under the umbrella of whitebox fuzzing.
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Mutation-based Whitebox Fuzzing
Mutation-based whitebox fuzzing systems, such as SAGE [100], collect symbolic taints
at the x86 instruction level of a testing target which executes initially well formed
inputs and then systematically solve symbolic path constraints in order to derive new
concrete test inputs that will force new execution paths. TaintScope [179], BuzzFuzz [88],
Angora [65] employ symbolic taint tracing to identify which input bytes of well-formed
inputs are used in branch conditionals and then focus on modifying specifically those
bytes. Others systems, such as T-Fuzz [151], Steelix [125], and VUzzer [159], use static and
dynamic taint analysis to detect input checks that the fuzzer-generated inputs fail, and
then transform the testing target by removing these checks to increase code coverage.
Grammar-based Whitebox Fuzzing
The use of mutation-based whitebox fuzzing approaches have been very successful in
testing programs that process inputs with relatively simple structure [55]. However,
mutation-based whitebox fuzzing, like its blackbox and greybox counterparts, is limited
when testing programs that process with highly-structured inputs. Although tracing is
more precise due to the use of symbolic taints, the granularity of the taints is too fine-
grained (e.g., at the byte-level). This leads to an enormous number of control flow paths
in an early processing stage and many redundant mutations that produce mutants which
cannot reach deep parts of the target program, beyond lexers and syntactic parsers.
To tackle this problem, grammar-based whitebox fuzzing approaches [99;130] combine
symbolic execution and grammar-based specifications of valid inputs formats to greatly
reduce the set of new test inputs generated. These approaches either use grammars
to pre-generate strings and then, starting from those pre-generated strings, leverage
symbolic execution (treating grammar primitives as symbolic) to generate new test
inputs [130], or involve custom grammar-based constraint solvers that exploit the gram-
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mar for solving constraints and generate new test inputs which are, by construction,
grammatically valid [99].
Overall, it is still largely unclear how to adopt whitebox fuzzing approaches—which
have at their core symbolic execution, and more specifically, a synergy between symbolic
and concrete execution—in the domain of cloud service testing which is the theme of
this dissertation. However, symbolic execution has been extensively used to test systems
written in low-level languages and the relevant literature is described next.
2.2 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution of programs was first introduced in the 70s by EFFIGY [116] and
SELECT [56]. Instead of supplying normal, concrete inputs to a program (e.g., integer
numbers), one supplies symbols representing arbitrary values and the execution pro-
ceeds arriving at expressions in terms of those symbols and constraints encoding the
possible outcomes of each conditional branch. In essence, symbolic execution summa-
rizes classes of inputs of a path into a boolean formula. Eventually, symbolic execution
partitions the space of program inputs into classes of inputs that follow the same path.
Initially, symbolic execution was tout as a program verification technique but till
today this goal remains elusive for large, complex software. Instead, symbolic execution
and symbolic execution engines are primarily used for dynamic, high-coverage test case
generation [62;63;64;173;39;124].
Unfortunately, dynamic symbolic execution has some fundamental limitations when
testing large, complex software: first, the path explosion problem: the number of fea-
sible paths can be exponential in the program size, or even infinite if the program
has a single loop whose number of iterations may depend on some unbounded input.
Second, the environment modeling problem: the symbolic execution engine must me-
diate between the program and its environment (e.g., external libraries and various OS
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components). Existing approaches usually incomplete because they either concretize
calls to the environment or use abstract abstract models of the environment. Third,
unsupported path constrains: pure symbolic execution engines cannot reason on the
feasibility of paths that depend on constraints outside the theories supported by the
solver (e.g., non-linear) or that depend on unknown or non-invertible operations (e.g.,
hash functions). Furthermore, there is significant engineering effort involved in build-
ing symbolic execution engines and the performance overhead incurred (due to tracing
and solving complex path constraints) is also non-negligible.
Over the last decades, especially after significant progress on constraint solvers [80],
many attempts have arisen trying to harness some of these limitations. For example,
various works have investigated heuristics to alleviate the path explosion [54;158;59] and
the environment problems [64;66]. Others have investigated parallelization of symbolic
execution on clusters of commodity hardware [58] or have exploited the compositionality
of test cases [97;112], state merging [47;40], targeted program transformations [61], and loop
handling optimizations [164]. Indeed, all these ideas have largely improved the appli-
cability of symbolic execution to test real software. However, the ability for full and
complete symbolic execution remains elusive on complex software. In practice, today
many systems built upon a synergy between concrete and symbolic execution.
When dealing with complex software, symbolic reasoning may be impossible for
some inputs (e.g., due path contains outside the reasoning scope of the solver). In such
cases, dynamic symbolic execution can leverage runtime information and use concrete
values of inputs can be used instead. For example, image a conditional checking the
values of two inputs, one of which is fed to a hash-function. Since the constraint solver
cannot solve the respective path constraint, there is no way to symbolically reason
about both outcomes of the branch in question. Nevertheless, concrete values can be
used to simplify the constrain and allow dynamic test case generation to proceed.
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The key design choice is to sacrificing completeness (i.e., concretize symbolic inputs)
in favor of precision of test case generation. This idea was first presented in DART [98]
and was later extended with symbolic memory pointers in CUTE [165]. The synergy be-
tween concrete and symbolic execution, also known as concolic execution, is at the core
of mutation-based whitebox fuzzing systems, such as SAGE [100]. Concolic execution
has also motivated various hybrid approaches that combine symbolic execution with
random testing [129] or fuzzing [169;183;146], and active property checking [101;138].
Despite the undeniable success of whitebox approaches using symbolic execution
to test software (especially written in low-level languages), the material presented in
this dissertation regards testing of cloud services. It remains currently unclear how
to employ symbolic execution to test complex software conglomerates, such as cloud
services. Nonetheless, it is an interesting avenue to further investigate.
2.3 Model-based Testing
In model-based testing, an abstraction of a target system, called model, and its envi-
ronment are used to produce test cases. Model-based testing is not to be confused with
traditional model checking which is a formal formal method to test if the computations
of a system are “models” with respect to temporal logic formulas. Model-based testing
approaches to test Finite State Machines (FSM) [110;174;105;156;182] appeared in the 90s.
Compared to material discussed in this dissertation, model-based testing is closer
to blackbox grammar-based fuzzing. The difference between model-based testing and
grammar-based fuzzing is that the former generates test inputs to test an abstraction
of a system, whereas the latter uses grammar rules describing how inputs conforming
to a specific domain can be generated. Recently, model-based testing has been used to
test file systems [106], operating system device drivers [161;68], and systems on chip [81;141].
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2.4 Combinatorial Test Generation
Given a program and a set of input parameters, combinatorial test generation aims at
efficiently generating test inputs which cover as many combinations of input parameters
as possible [75;160;120;78;128;76]. The input parameter combinations exercised can be pair-
wise [120] or n-way [78;128;76]. In practice, these techniques are today used to test system
configuration parameters, where the number of distinct input parameters is sufficiently
small. The material discussed in the next chapters shares some common ideas with
combinatorial test generation. Specifically, in grammar-based fuzzing, the number of




Stateful REST API Fuzzing
In this chapter, we describe RESTler, the first stateful REST API fuzzing system.
Stateful REST API fuzzing is the cornerstone of this dissertation. It was first introduced
by RESTler [44] and was then extended with active checkers capturing desirable REST
API security properties [46] (see Chapter 4) and with learning-based mutations and
coverage-guided feedback [45] (see Chapter 5).
3.1 Background and Motivation
Today, most cloud services are programmatically accessed by third-party applications [38]
and other services [143] through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that follow
the REpresentational State Transfer (REST) software architectural style [84]. Mean-
while, cloud service developers increasingly use interface-description languages, such as
the OpenAPI Specification (OAS) [29], to describe and document their REST APIs [13;23;11]
or to automatically generate sample client code in various programming languages.
Despite the rapid evolution of cloud services, systems to automatically test cloud
services through their REST APIs are still in their infancy. The most sophisticated
testing systems currently available, capture live traffic, and then fuzz and replay the
recorded traffic with the hope of finding unknown errors [8;34;6]. Such systems do not
explicitly capture dependencies among multiple API requests and, unfortunately, test
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only shallow service states reached by individual requests.
In contrast, RESTler performs stateful REST API fuzzing. Stateful means that
RESTler generates test cases which consist of multiple interdependent API requests
that explore subtle states and thoroughly test the target cloud service. To accomplish
this, RESTler first carries out a lightweight static analysis of an entire OpenAPI spec-
ification, and then generates (and executes) test cases that exercise the target cloud
service in a stateful manner. The static analysis performed by RESTler on API speci-
fications of target cloud services is described next.
3.2 Processing API Specifications
An interface-description language, such as OpenAPI [29], describes what requests a cloud
service can handle through its REST API and what responses may be expected. Given
such a specification (e.g., in JSON or YAML format), open-source tools automatically
generate web User Interfaces (UI) that allow users to view the documentation and
interact with the API a service via a web browser.
A sample OpenAPI specification, in its web-UI form, is shown in Figure 3.1. This
specification describes the API of a simple blog posts hosting service, which consists
of five request types to query, create, delete, access, and update, and delete blog posts
respectively. Each request type specifies the endpoint (i.e., HTTP path), the method
(i.e., HTTP verb), and required parameters (i.e., HTTP body).
Clicking on any of these five request types in a web browser expands the description
of the request type. For instance, selecting the second (POST) request in Figure 3.1
reveals text similar to the left of Figure 3.2. This text describes (in YAML format) the
expected syntax for the specific request and its response: the definition part of the
specification indicates that an object named body of type string is required and that
an object named id of type integer is optional (since it is not required); the path part
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Figure 3.1: Sample OpenAPI specification of blog posts service. Shows the
OpenAPI specification of a sample blog posts service.
of the specification describes the HTTP-syntax for this POST request and the format
of the expected response.
From such a specification, RESTler automatically constructs the test-generation
grammar shown on the right of Figure 3.2. RESTler’s test generation (fuzzing) grammar
is encoded in executable python code. It consists of code to generate an HTTP request
(of type POST in this case) and of code to process the expected response of this request
(which produces a post id in this case).
Each function restler_static simply appends the string it takes as argument
without modifying it. In contrast, the function restler_fuzzable takes as argument
a value type (like string in this example) and replaces it by one value of that type
taken from a small dictionary of values for that type. How dictionaries are defined
and how values are selected is discussed in the next subsection of this chapter. The
specific response is expected to return a new dynamic object (a dynamically created
resource id) named id of type integer. Using the schema shown on the left, RESTler
automatically generates the function parse_posts shown on the right.
Furthermore, by leveraging the semantics of the RESTful architectural design style
(i.e., the naming conventions and the placement of resource hierarchies in paths),























from restler import requests



















Figure 3.2: OpenAPI specification and automatically-generaterd RESTler
grammar. Shows a snippet of OpenAPI specification in YAML format (left) and
the corresponding grammar automatically generated by RESTler (right).
ification. For instance, in the particular example, RESTler will infer that the ids “pro-
duces” in the response of the second request are necessary to generate well-formed paths
for the last three requests whose path “consume” such ids. Such producer-consumer
dependencies extracted by RESTler, are used by the core test case generation algorithm
to create sequences of interdependent request (i.e., requests with producer-consumer
dependencies) which thoroughly test target cloud services in a stateful manner.
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3.3 Test Case Generation for Stateful REST API
Fuzzing
The main algorithm used by RESTler for test generation is shown in Figure 3.3 in
python-like notation. It starts (line 3) by processing an OpenAPI specification as
discussed in the previous section. The result of this processing is a set of request types,
denoted reqSet, and of their dependencies.
The algorithm operates on a set of request sequences, denoted seqSet, which ini-
tially only contains empty sequence ϵ (line 5). A request sequence is valid if every
response in the sequence has a valid return code (defined as HTTP status codes in
the 200 range). At each iteration of the main loop (line 8), starting with n = 1, the
algorithm generates and executes all valid request sequences of length n before moving
on to length n+ 1, and so on, until a user-specified maxLength is reached. Generating
valid request sequences and adding them in seqSet is done in two steps.
First, the set of valid request sequences of length n−1 is extended (line 9) to create a
set of new sequences of length n by appending each request with satisfied dependencies
at the end of each sequence, as described in the EXTEND function (line 13). The
function DEPENDENCIES (line 36) checks if all dependencies of the specified request
are satisfied. This is true when every dynamic object that is a required parameter
of the request, denoted by CONSUMES(req), is produced by some response to the
request sequence preceding it, denoted by PRODUCES(seq). If all the dependencies
are satisfied, the new sequence of length n is retained (line 18); otherwise it is discarded.
Second, each newly-extended request sequence whose dependencies are satisfied is
rendered (line 10) one by one as described in the RENDER function (line 21). For
every newly-appended request (line 24), the list of all fuzzable primitive types in the
request is computed (line 25) (those are identified by restler_fuzzable in the code
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1 Inputs: openapi_spec, maxLength
2 # Set of requests parsed from the OpenAPI spec
3 reqSet = PROCESS(openapi_spec)
4 # Set of sequences (initially an empty sequence)
5 seqSet = {ϵ}
6 # Main loop: iterate up to a given maximum sequence length
7 n = 1
8 while (n <= maxLength):
9 seqSet = EXTEND(seqSet, reqSet)
10 seqSet = RENDER(seqSet)
11 n += 1
12 # Extend all sequences in seqSet by appending new requests
13 def EXTEND(seqSet, reqSet):
14 newSeqSet = {}
15 for seq in seqSet:
16 for req in reqSet:
17 if DEPENDENCIES(seq, req):
18 newSeqSet = newSeqSet + concat(seq, req)
19 return newSeqSet
20 # Concretize all newly appended requests using dictionary values
21 def RENDER(seqSet):
22 newSeqSet = {}
23 for seq in seqSet:
24 req = last_request_in(seq)
25 V⃗ = tuple_of_fuzzable_types_in(req)
26 for v⃗ in V⃗ :
27 newReq = concretize(req, v⃗)
28 newSeq = concat(seq, newReq)
29 response = EXECUTE(newSeq)
30 if response has a valid code:




35 # Check that all objects used in req are produced by seq
36 def DEPENDENCIES(seq, req):
37 if CONSUMES(req) ⊆ PRODUCES(seq):
38 return True
39 return False
40 # Objects required in a request
41 def CONSUMES(req):
42 return object_types_required_in(req)
43 # Objects produced in the responses of a sequence of requests
44 def PRODUCES(seq):
45 dynamicObjects = {}
46 for req in seq:
47 newObjs = objects_produced_in_response_of(req)
48 dynamicObjects = dynamicObjects + newObjs
49 return dynamicObjects
Figure 3.3: Main test case generation algorithm used by RESTler. Shows the
implementation of the test case generation algorithm used by RESTler.
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shown on the right of Figure 3.2). Then, each fuzzable primitive type in the request
is concretized, which substitutes one concrete value of that type taken out of a finite,
user-configurable dictionary of values.
For instance, for fuzzable type integer, RESTler might use a small dictionary with
the values 0, 1, and -10, while for fuzzable type string, a dictionary could be defined
with the values “sampleString”, the empty string, and a very long fixed string. The
function RENDER generates all possible such combinations (line 26). Each combi-
nation thus corresponds to a fully-defined request newReq (line 27) which is HTTP-
syntactically correct. The function RENDER then executes this new request sequence
(line 29), and checks its response: if the response has a valid status code, the new re-
quest sequence is valid and retained (line 31); otherwise, it is discarded and the received
error code is logged for analysis and debugging.
More precisely, the function EXECUTE executes each request in a sequence one by
one, each time checking that the response is valid, extracting and memoizing dynamic
objects (if any), and providing those in subsequent requests in the sequence if needed, as
determined by the dependency analysis; the response returned by function EXECUTE
in line 29 refers to the response received for the last, newly-appended request in the
sequence. Note that if a request sequence produces more than one dynamic object of a
given type, the function EXECUTE will memoize all of those objects, but will provide
them later when needed by subsequent requests in the exact order in which they are
produced; in other words, the function EXECUTE will not try different ordering of
such objects. If a dynamic object is passed as argument to a subsequent request and is
“destroyed” after that request, i.e., it becomes unusable later on, RESTler will detect
this by receiving an invalid status code, outside the 200 range (e.g., a 400 or a 500
status code) when attempting to reuse that unusable object, and will then discard that
request sequence.
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By default, the function RENDER of Figure 3.3 generates all possible combinations
of dictionary values for every request with several fuzzable types (see line 26). For large
dictionaries, this may result in astronomical numbers of combinations. In that case, a
more scalable option is to randomly sample each dictionary for one (or a few) values,
or to use combinatorial-testing algorithms [75] for covering, say, every dictionary value,
or every pair of values, but not every k-tuple. In the experiments reported later, we
used small dictionaries and the default RENDER function shown in Figure 3.3.
Optimizations
The function EXTEND of Figure 3.3 generates all request sequences of length n + 1
whose dependencies are satisfied. Since n is incremented at each iteration of the main
loop of line 8, the overall algorithm performs a complete breadth-first search (BFS) in
the search space defined by all possible request sequences. To harness the combinatorial
explosion of a complete BFS we investigate two optimization.
BFS-Fast. In function EXTEND, instead of appending every request to every se-
quence, every request is appended to at most one sequence. This results in in a smaller
set newSeqSet which covers (i.e., includes at least once) every request but does not gen-
erate all valid request sequences. Like BFS, BFS-Fast still exercises every executable
request type at each iteration of the main loop in line 8: it still provides full grammar
coverage with respect to all possible rendering of each individual request but does not
explore all possible request sequence combinations for a given sequence length. This
allows BFS-Fast to scale better than BFS and to generate longer request sequences.
RandomWalk. In function EXTEND, the two loops of line 15 and line 16 are elim-
inated; instead, the function now returns a single new sequence of requests whose
dependencies are satisfied and which is generated by randomly appending one req from
reqSet to the current (one) seq in seqSet. (The function always chooses a req that
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satisfies all dependencies of seq.) Once a seq of length n has been constructed, the
main loop of line 8 will proceed to construct a sequence of length n + 1 while main-
taining a seqSet with exactly one sequence (of the previous iteration). Furthermore,
in function RENDER, when the condition of line 30 is satisfied (i.e., a valid rendering
of the last request has been found), the loop of line 26 will stop.
In essence, RandomWalk sacrifices full grammar coverage both with respect to all
possible renderings of individual requests and with respect to all possible request combi-
nations for a given sequence length. This design choice allows RandomWalk to explore
the search space of possible request sequences deeper more quickly than BFS or BFS-
Fast in a random, non-systematic manner. When RandomWalk can no longer extend
the current request sequence, it restarts from scratch from an empty seqSet and re-
peats the same process, trying to construct a new sequence. Since RandomWalk does
not memoize past request sequences between restarts, it might regenerate the same
request sequence multiple times.
In Chapter 3.6, we report experiments performed on three production-scale open-
source services comparing the scalability of BFS, BFS-Fast, and RandomWalk in term
of code coverage achieved and new bugs found. Next, we discuss some implementation
details of RESTler.
3.4 Implementation of Stateful REST API Fuzzing
in RESTler
We have implemented RESTler in 3, 151 lines of modular python code split into: the
parser and compiler module, the core fuzzing runtime module, and the garbage collector
(GC) module.
The parser and compiler module is used to parse an OpenAPI specification and to
27
generate the RESTler grammar describing how to fuzz a target service. (In the absence
of an OpenAPI specification, the user could directly provide the RESTler grammar.)
The core fuzzing runtime module implements the algorithm of Chapter 3.3 and its
variants. It renders API requests, processes service-side responses to retrieve values of
the dynamic objects created, and analyzes service-side feedback to decide which requests
should be reused in future generations while composing new request sequences. Finally,
the GC runs as a separate thread that tracks the creation of the dynamic objects over
time and periodically deletes aging objects that exceed some user-defined limit.
RESTler is currently a command-line tool that takes as input an OpenAPI speci-
fication, service access parameters (e.g. IP, port, authentication), the mutations dic-
tionary, and the search strategy to use during fuzzing. After compiling the OpenAPI
specification, RESTler displays the number of endpoints discovered and the list of re-
solved and unresolved dependencies, if any. In case of unresolved dependencies, the user
may provide additional annotations or resource-specific mutations (see Section 3.5) and
re-run this step to resolve them. Alternatively, the user may choose to start fuzzing
right away and RESTler will treat unresolved dependencies in consumer parameters as
restler_fuzzable string primitives.
During fuzzing, RESTler treats each 500 status code (500 “Internal Server Error”)
received after executing a request sequence as a bug and uses a bucketization scheme
to cluster similar 500 “Internal Server Error” incidents.
Bug Bucketization
When fuzzing, different instances of a same bug are often found repeatedly. Since all
the bugs found have to be inspected by the user, it is therefore important in practice
to aid this analysis by identifying likely-redundant instances of a same unique bug.
Since we define a bug to be a 500 HTTP status code received after executing a
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request sequence, each bug found is associated with the request sequence that was exe-
cuted to uncover it. Given this property, we use the following bucketization procedure
for bugs found by RESTler:
Whenever a new bug is found, we compute all non-empty suffixes of its
non-rendered request sequence1 (starting with the smallest one) and check
whether some suffix is a previously-recorded sequence leading to a bug found
earlier. If there is a match, the new bug is added to the bucket of that
previous bug. Otherwise, a new bucket is created with the new bug and its
request sequence.
In the above procedure, requests in sequences are identified by their type, not by how
they are rendered: fuzzable primitive types are not taken into account and different
renderings of the same request are equivalent. When using BFS or BFS-Fast, This
bucketization scheme will identify bugs by the shortest sequence necessary to find it.
Baseline stateful REST API fuzzing described so far, can only find bugs manifested
as 500 “Internal Server Errors.” However, in Chapter 4, we describe how stateful REST
Fuzzing can be extended with active checkers that capture desirable REST API security
properties and detect errors beyond 500 “Internal Server Errors.”
3.5 Experiences with RESTler in Proprietary
Cloud Services
In this section, we describe our experiences running RESTler to test proprietary Azure [12]
and Microsoft Office365 [28] cloud services performing resource management and real-
time data aggregation. RESTler found several bugs (that have now been fixed) in all
four services tested. However, we also faced a number of challenges unique to pro-
prietary services, including resource quota limitations, short-lived access tokens, and
1A request sequence of length n has n suffixes of length 1, 2, . . . , n.
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complex API dependencies beyond the canonical REST API structure with application-
specific resource values and naming schemes. We describe the extensions made to
address these challenges.
Resource Quotas. Proprietary services that run in public clouds are deployed with
default resource quotas. Once the specific resource quotas are reached, RESTler’s test
generation algorithm will repeatedly attempt to execute request sequences containing
requests that can no longer succeed due to exceeded quotas (since these requests were
valid in prior tests and generated lots of new resources). This impedes test case gen-
eration progress. This challenge is unique to proprietary cloud deployments, contrary
to self-contained deployments where one can easily control and reconfigure resource
quotas. To address this problem, RESTler includes a garbage collector (GC). The GC
runs as a separate thread that monitors the creation of dynamic resources over time and
periodically deletes dynamic objects that are no longer used in order to avoid exceeding
resource quotas. This allows RESTler to continuously test new sequences for hours or
days without hitting resource-quota-related errors.
Short-lived Access Tokens. Unlike in self-contained deployments where an admin
can pre-populate static or long-lived authentication tokens, public cloud services use
short-lived, refreshable authentication tokens. Usually, a public endpoint, accessible
with some type of static credentials (e.g., a username-password pair or a master to-
ken) and service-specific logic, generates fresh, short-lived access tokens. The latter are
added in the header of HTTPS requests. Since different services may require custom
logic to access their public authentication endpoints, RESTler provides an authentica-
tion hook which periodically executes a user-provided piece of code (e.g., a script) and
propagates fresh values in the pool of refreshable authentication tokens.
Application-specific Naming Schemes. As discussed in Chapter 3.2, RESTler per-
forms a light-weight static analysis of a OpenAPI specification to infer dependencies
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among requests of the target REST API. However, part of a target API may not be fully
REST compliant, or the specification may be incomplete, and consequently the inferred
dependencies will also be incomplete. To address this challenge, RESTler supports an-
notations, which can be added directly to the specification (as OpenAPI extensions), in
order to explicitly declare dependencies, as well as resource-specific mutations, which
can be used for the creation of resources that require some custom format (e.g., an IP
address). These two features have proven useful in practice because, unlike the typi-
cal design of REST APIs, Azure services use PUT requests to create resources whose
user-provided names are passed as URL parameters and, after successful creation, are
also returned in the response. For this scenario, one can use resource-name-specific
mutations to indicate that a PUT request should create a resource named in a cus-
tom format, and then use that name to identify the corresponding dynamic object in
subsequent requests.
3.6 Evaluation
In this section, we present experimental results obtained with RESTler that answer the
following questions:
Q1: Are both inferring dependencies among request types and analyzing dynamic
feedback necessary for effective automated REST API fuzzing?
Q2: Are tests generated by RESTler exercising deeper service-side logic as sequence
length increases?
Q3: How do the three search strategies implemented in RESTler compare across var-
ious APIs in terms of code coverage?
Q4: How do the three search strategies implemented in RESTler compare across var-
ious APIs in terms of new bugs found?
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Experimental Setup
We answer the first question (Q1) using a simple blog posts service with a REST API.
We answer (Q2), (Q3), and (Q4) using three open-source, production-scale web services
with REST APIs.
Blog posts service. To answer (Q1) we use a simple blog posts service, written
in 189 lines of python code using the Flask web framework [86]. Its functionality is
exposed over a REST API with a OpenAPI specification shown in Figure 3.1. The
API contains five request types: (i) GET on /posts: returns all blog posts currently
registered; (ii) POST on /posts: creates a new blog post (body: the text of the blog
post); (iii) DELETE /posts/id: deletes a blog post; (iv) GET posts/id: returns the
body and the checksum of an individual blog post; and (v) PUT /posts/id: updates
the contents of a blog post (body: the new text of the blog post and the checksum of
the older version of the blog post’s text).
In order to model an imaginary subtle bug, at every update of a blog post (PUT
request with body text and checksum) the service checks if the checksum provided in
the request matches the recorded checksum for the current blog post, and if it does, an
uncaught exception is raised. Thus, this bug will be triggered only if dependencies on
dynamic objects shared across requests are taken into account during test generation.
Production-scale cloud services. To answer (Q2), (Q3), and (Q4) we use three
open-source, production-scale cloud services; namely GitLab, Mastodon, and Spree.
First, we use GitLab enterprise version 11.11 and test API families related to com-
mon version control operations. GitLab is an open-source web service for self-hosted
Git, its back-end is written in over 376K lines of ruby code using ruby-on-rails, and its
functionality is exposed through REST APIs. It is used by more than 100, 000 organi-
zations, has millions of users, and has currently a 2/3 market share of the self-hosted
Git market [95]. We configure GitLab to use Nginx HTTP web server and 20 Unicorn
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Target Service API Family Total Requests
GitLab Commits 15 (*11)
Brances 8 (*2)
Issues & Notes 25 (*20)
User Groups 53 (*2)
Projects 54 (*5)
Repos & Files 12 (*22)
Mastodon Accounts & Lists 26 (*3)
Statuses 18 (*19)
Spree Storefront Cart 8 (*11)
Table 3.1: Target Cloud Service APIs. Shows the number of distinct request types
in each API family and the average number of primitive value combinations that are
available for each request type (*).
workers with 4GB of physical memory. We use postgreSQL with 20 workers and the de-
fault GitLab configuration for sidekiq queues and redis workers. According to GitLab’s
recommendations, such configuration scales up to 4, 000 concurrent users [94].
Second, we use Mastodon version 3.1.1, an open-source, self-hosted social network-
ing service with more than 4.4M users [132]. We follow the same configuration, as in
GitLab, regarding Unicorn workers and persistent storage.
Third, we use Spree, an open-source e-commerce platform for Rails 6 with over
1M downloads [168]. We test the default sandbox configuration of version 4.0. All the
experiments discussed in this evaluations were run on Ubuntu 18.04 Google Cloud
VMs [22] with 8 logical CPU cores and 52GB of physical memory. Each fuzzing client is
used to test a target service deployment running on the same machine
Table 3.1 shows characteristics of the target service APIs, such as the total number
of requests in each API family and the average number of different values available to
fuzz each request. The total number of requests in each API family and the average
number of values available per request indicate the size of the respective fuzzing space.
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Fuzzing dictionaries. To maintain the size of the search space small and, at the
same time, perform some meaningful fuzzing we use a small, predifined dictionary of
values available for each primitive type. string fuzzable types have possible values
“sampleString” and “” (empty string); integer fuzzable types have possible values “0”
and “1”; boolean fuzzable types have possible values “true” and “false”.
Techniques for effective REST API fuzzing (Q1)
In this section, we report results with our blog posts service to determine whether both
(1) inferring dependencies among request types and (2) analyzing dynamic feedback
are necessary for effective automated REST API fuzzing (Q1). We choose a simple
service in order to clearly measure and interpret the testing capabilities of the two core
techniques being evaluated. Those capabilities are evaluated by measuring service code
coverage and client-visible HTTP status codes.
Specifically, we compare results obtained when exhaustively generating all possible
request sequences of length up to three, with three different test-generation algorithms:
1. RESTler ignores dependencies among request types and treats dynamic objects –
such as post id and checksum – as fuzzable primitive type string objects, while
still analyzing dynamic feedback.
2. RESTler ignores service-side dynamic feedback and does not eliminate invalid
sequences during the search, but still infers dependencies among request types
and generates request sequences satisfying those.
3. RESTler uses the algorithm of Figure 3.3 using both dependencies among request
types and dynamic feedback.
Figure 3.4 shows the number of tests, i.e., request sequences, up to maximum length
3, generated by each of these three algorithms, from left to right. The top plots show
the cumulative code coverage measured in lines of code over time, as well as when the
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Figure 3.4: Blog posts service code coverage and HTTP status codes over
time. Shows the increase in code coverage over time (left) and the respective cumulative
number of HTTP status codes received over time (right). Top: RESTler utilizes both
dependencies among request types and dynamic feedback. Middle: RESTler ignores
dynamic feedback. Bottom: RESTler ignores dependencies among request types. When
leveraging both techniques, RESTler achieves the best code coverage and finds the
planted 500 “Internal Server Error” bug with the least number of tests.
sequence length increases. The bottom plots show the cumulative number of HTTP
status codes received.
Code Coverage. First, we observe that without considering dependencies among
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request types (Figure 3.4, bottom left), code coverage is limited to up to 130 lines and
there is no increase over time, despite increasing the length of request sequences. This
illustrates the limitations of using a naive approach to test a service where values of
dynamic objects like id and checksum cannot be randomly guessed or picked among
values in a small predefined dictionary. In contrast, by inferring dependencies among
requests and by processing service responses RESTler achieves an increase in code
coverage up to 150 lines of code (Figure 3.4, middle left and top left).
Second, we see that without considering dynamic feedback to prune invalid request
sequences in the search space (Figure 3.4, middle) the number of tests generated grows
quickly, even for a simple API. Specifically, without considering dynamic feedback
(Figure 3.4, middle right), RESTler produces more than 4, 600 tests that take 1, 750
seconds and cover about 150 lines of code. In contrast, by considering dynamic feed-
back (Figure 3.4, top), the state space is significantly reduced and RESTler achieves
the same code coverage with less than 800 test cases and only 179 seconds.
HTTP Status Codes. We make two observations. First, focusing on 40X status
codes, we notice a high number of 40X responses when ignoring dynamic feedback
(Figure 3.4, middle right). This indicates that without considering service-side dynamic
feedback, the number of possible invalid request sequences grows quickly. In contrast,
considering dynamic feedback dramatically decreases the percentage of 40X status codes
from 60% to 26% without using dependencies among request types (Figure 3.4, bottom
right) and to 20% with using dependencies among request types (Figure 3.4, top right).
Moreover, when using dependencies among request types (Figure 3.4, bottom right), we
observe the highest percentage of 20X status codes (approximately 80%), indicating that
RESTler then exercises a larger part of the service logic – also confirmed by coverage
data (Figure 3.4, top left).












Commits 15 (*11) 1 598 1 1 1
2 1108 7 5 10
3 1196 250 46 521
4 1760 2220 1341 6577
5 1760 3667 20679 12518
Branches 8 (*2) 1 598 1 1 1
2 1089 8 6 11
3 1172 58 44 107
4 1182 576 387 1279
5 1185 3644 5528 9336
Issues 25 (*20) 1 816 37 37 37
2 1163 2444 1839 4245
3 1163 4156 15658 8870
User Groups 53 (*2) 1 887 39 39 38
2 1177 3508 3360 5204
3 1177 4817 79518 8946
Projects 54 (*5) 1 934 42 41 38
2 1192 1870 1781 3343
3 1203 3226 18173 7374
Repos & Files 12 (*22) 1 598 1 1 1
2 1117 97 65 206
3 1181 5153 2194 15472
Accounts & Lists 26 (*3) 1 4 30 8 8
2 215 470 424 544
3 656 30229 24300 42199
Statuses 18 (*19) 1 4 60 8 8
2 333 5908 416 6272
3 631 28926 5192 55376
Storefront Cart 8 (*11) 1 10 1 1 1
2 208 2 6 2
3 1473 47 98 62
4 1943 6380 6201 21309
Table 3.2: Testing common GitLab, Mastodon, and Spree APIs with
RESTler. Shows the increase in sequence length, code coverage, tests executed,
seqSet size, and the number of dynamic objects being created using BFS for 5 hours.
Longer request sequences gradually increase service-side code coverage.
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codes are detected (Figure 3.4, bottom right), while RESTler finds a handful of 500
status codes when using dependencies among request types (see Figure 3.4, top right
and middle right). These 500 responses are triggered by the unhandled exception
we planted in our blog posts service after a PUT blog update request with a checksum
matching the previous blog post’s body (see Chapter 3.6). When ignoring dependencies
among request types, RESTler misses this bug (Figure 3.4, bottom right). In contrast,
when analyzing dependencies across request types and using the checksum returned by
a previous GET /posts/id request in a subsequent PUT /posts/id update request
with the same id, RESTler does trigger the bug. Furthermore, when additionally using
dynamic feedback, the search space is pruned while preserving this bug, which is then
found with the least number of tests (Figure 3.4, bottom right).
Overall, these experiments illustrate the complementarity between utilizing depen-
dencies among request types and using dynamic feedback, and show that both are
needed for effective REST API fuzzing.
Deeper service exploration (Q2)
In this section, we present experiments to determine whether the tests generated by
RESTler exercise deeper service-side logic as sequence length increases (Q2). We per-
form individual experiments on the nine API families using 5h fuzzing sessions with the
default test-generation algorithm of RESTler (i.e., BFS). For each experiment, we limit
the number of fuzzable primitive-type combinations to maximum 1, 000 combinations
per request. Between experiments, we force the entire GitLab, Mastodon, or Spree
service to restart from the same initial state.
Table 3.2 shows the increase (going down) in the sequence length, the increase in
code coverage (new lines after boot), the total number of tests executed, the seqSet size
(see Figure 3.3), and the number of dynamic objects created until the 5-hours timeout.
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API BFS BFS-Fast RandomWalk
SeqSet Len Req SeqSet Len Req SeqSet Len Req
Commits 64579 5 15/15 20 27 15/15 1 9 (2850) 10/15
Branches 44805 6 8/8 8 100 8/8 1 14 (3392) 8/8
Issues &
Notes
58332 3 6/25 99 17 25/25 1 17 (376) 24/25
User
Groups
31621 3 28/53 93 33 50/53 1 40 (1341) 51/53
Projects 50541 3 36/54 16 48 54/54 1 13 (2047) 52/54
Repos
& Files
77666 4 11/12 121 19 11/12 1 8 (3352) 12/12
Accounts
& Lists
142124 4 24/26 24 75 24/26 1 3 (17652) 24/26
Statuses 288448 4 18/18 40 39 18/18 1 2 (13672) 15/18
Storefront
Cart
98571 5 8/8 45 100 8/8 1 24 (1481) 7/8
Table 3.3: Comparison of BFS, BFS-Fast and RandomWalk after 48 hours.
Shows the seqSet size for each search strategy, the maximum sequence length (Ran-
domWalk restarts in parenthesis), and the request coverage (i.e., requests that have
been executed at least once) after 48 hours in GitLab, Mastodon, and Spree. BFS-
Fast and RandomWalk maintain a much smaller seqSet compared to BFS, and usually
construct longer request sequences and achieve better request coverage.
Code Coverage. The fourth column of Table 3.2 shows the cumulative code cover-
age achieved after executing all the request sequences generated by RESTler for each
sequence length, or until the 5-hours timeout expires. The results are incremental on
top of the initial lines of code executed, by default, during booting each service (i.e.,
16, 836 lines for GitLab, 6, 434 for Mastodon, and 3, 359 for Spree). Later on, we com-
plement these results, in the next subsection, with graphs showing how coverage evolves
over time 48h in Figure 3.5. However, here, our purpose is not to compare RESTler’s
code coverage against developers’ test cases code coverage or how it evolves over time.
Instead, the focus is to demonstrate that RESTler test-cases exercise deeper states of
server-side logic as sequence length increases.
From Table 3.2, we can clearly see that longer sequence lengths consistently increase
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service-side code coverage across all nine APIs and all three services. This is the desired
and expected behaviour which demonstrates the key strength of stateful REST API
fuzzing: the test sequences generated by stateful REST API fuzzing successfully test
functionality that can be exercised only by sequences of interdependent requests.
As an example, consider the GitLab functionality of “selecting a commit”. According
to GitLab’s specification, selecting a commit requires two dynamic objects, a project-
id and a commit-id, and the following dependency of requests is implicit: (1) a user
needs to create a project, (2) use the respective project-id to post a new commit, and
then (3) select the commit using its commit-id and the respective project-id. Clearly,
this operation can only be performed by sequences of three requests or more. For the
Commit APIs, note the gradual increase in coverage from 598 to 1, 108 to 1, 196 lines
of code for sequence lengths of one, two, and three, respectively. Most notably, for the
Branches API, service-side code coverage keeps gradually increasing for sequences of
length up to five, and reaches 1, 185 lines when the 5-hours limit expires. Similarly,
for the Storefront Cart APIs, service-side code coverage keeps gradually increasing for
sequences of length up to four, and reaches 1, 943 lines when the 5-hours limit expires.
Tests, Sequence Sets, and Dynamic Objects. In addition to code coverage, Table
3.2 also shows the increase in the number of tests executed, the size of seqSet after the
RENDER function returns in line 10 of Figure 3.3, and the number of dynamic objects
created by RESTler. One test here means, one stateful sequence of requests of length
depending on the value of n in line 7 of Figure 3.3.
We observe, in the last three columns of Table 3.2 that the number of tests, the
size of the seqSet, and the number of dynamic objects created rapidly increases with
sequence length across all APIs due to the exhaustive nature of the BFS search strategy.
Nevertheless, we emphasize that without the two key techniques evaluated in Chapter
3.6 this growth would be much worse.
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For instance, for the Commit API, the SeqSet size is 20, 679 and there are 12, 518
dynamic objects created by RESTler for sequences of length up to five. By comparison,
since the Commits API has 15 request types with an average of 11 rendering combi-
nations, the number of all possible rendered request sequences of up to length four is
already more than 741 millions and a naive brute-force enumeration of those would
clearly be intractable. Similarly, for the Storefront Cart API, the SeqSet size is 6, 201
and there are 21, 309 dynamic objects created by RESTler for sequences of length up to
four. By comparison, since the API has 8 request types with an average of 11 rendering
combinations, the number of all possible rendered request sequences of up to length
four is already more than 59 millions. Still, even with the two core techniques used in
RESTler, the search space explodes quickly. Next, we evaluate two BFS optimizations.
Search strategies: Code coverage (Q3)
We now present results of experiments comparing the BFS, BFS-Fast, and RandomWalk
search strategies defined in Chapter 3.3 (Q3). For each search strategy, Table 4.1 shows
the maximum sequence length achieved after 48 hours, the respective request coverage
(i.e., the number of requests that have been used in at least one test case), and the size of
the seqSet when the 48-hours timeout is reached. For the RandomWalk search strategy
the total number of restarts is also shown in parenthesis. Additionally, Figure 3.5 shows
the cumulative service-side code coverage increase (on top of the boot coverage) for the
three search strategies over 48 hours. We compare the search strategies.
First, we examine BFS. From Table 4.1 we observe that across all APIs BFS
maintains the largest seqSet size, compared to BFS-Fast and RandomWalk. This is
inevitable since BFS provides full grammar coverage both with respect to all possible
value combinations of each individual request and with respect to all possible request
type combinations given a sequence length (see Chapter 3.3) and, therefore, explores a
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of BFS, BFS-Fast and RandomWalk code coverage
over 48 hours in GitLab, Mastodon, and Spree. Shows the percentage code cov-
erage increase (on top of the initial boot coverage) for BFS, BFS-Fast and RandomWalk
over 48 hours in GitLab, Mastodon, and Spree. BFS-Fast and RandomWalk perform
evidently better than BFS in API families with many requests or many possible value
combinations per request.
considerably larger search space. Consequently, BFS does not scale well: it constructs
shorter sequences than BFS-Fast and RandomWalk, especially in APIs with relatively
many possible value combinations per request (e.g., Issues: 3 versus 17 and 17; Repos
& Files: 4 versus 19 and 8) and in APIs with relatively many request types (e.g., User
Groups: 3 versus 33 and 40; Projects: 3 versus 16 and 13). Notable exceptions are the
APIs of Mastodon (Accounts & Lists and Statuses), in which RandomWalk performs
worst in terms of maximum sequence length achieved.
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To understand the reason behind this differentiation we explain how these two
API families differ from all the rest. All APIs have a base parent request. That is, a
producer of dynamic resources which are a necessary dependencies for all other requests.
For example, in GitLab, the base parent is a request type which produces a project-id
correlated with some user that can perform various actions. Similarly, in Spree, the
base parent is a request type which constructs a fresh user-id correlated with some user
that can then perform various actions. These base parent request types have exactly
one possible value combination both in GitLab and in Spree. However, the respective
base parent request type in Mastodon (which creates a fresh user account) has thirty
possible value combinations, out of which, only one is valid. To make matters worse,
RandomWalk does not memoize request renderings between restarts (see Chapter 3.3).
Therefore, RandomWalk has a relatively low probability of randomly selecting the one
valid value combination compared to all other APIs of GitLab and Mastodon (i.e., 1 out
of 30 versus 1 out of 1). This forces RandomWalk to perform many restarts. Specifically,
there are 17, 652 restarts for Accounts & Lists and 13, 672 restarts for Statuses, which
is an order of magnitude more than all other APIs.
Finally, from Table 4.1, we see that BFS provides the worst request coverage and
in various API families (such as Issues & Notes, User Groups, and Projects) there are
many requests than have never been executed after 48h. For example, in Issues &
Notes, out of the 25 total requests, only 6 have been covered after 48h. To understand
the exact size of the state space explored by BFS in Issues after 48h, consider that for
sequence length three the most complex test case creates a project (one possible value
combination), then creates an issue (108 value combinations), and then edits an issue
(324 value combinations). Fully exploring the search space of this single one test case,
using BFS, leads to approximately 35K value combinations. (Let alone exploring the
search space defined by all sequences in seqSet after multiple hours.) The conclusions
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drawn from Table 4.1, with respect to request coverage, are also in line with what can
be observed in Figure 3.5, regarding service-side code coverage. In particular, Figure
3.5 shows that BFS performs worst in Issues & Notes, User Groups, and Projects, which
is exactly what was discussed above.
Second, we examine BFS-Fast. We observe, in Table 4.1, that BFS-fast main-
tains a considerably smaller seqSet than BFS (in fact many orders of magnitude)
across all APIs. This is expected because, by design, BFS-Fast sacrifices full grammar
coverage with respect to all possible request combinations for a given sequence length,
and instead, given a sequence length, it appends each request exactly once per gener-
ation. Specifically, the largest seqSet for BFS-Fast is 121 (for Repos & Files), while
the largest seqSet for BFS is 288, 448 (for Statuses). In comparison with BFS-Fast,
only RandomWalk (discussed next) maintains a smaller seqSet which always consists
of exactly one sequence. Additionally, BFS-Fast always constructs longer sequences
than BFS after 48h. In Branches and in Storefront Chart BFS-Fast it even reaches
length 100, which is the maximum, user-defined allowed sequence length. Furthermore,
from Table 4.1, we observe that BFS-Fast achieves considerably better request coverage
than BFS and similar to RandomWalk. Indeed, after 48h, BFS-Fast covers all requests
in most API families, except User Groups, Repos & Files, and Accounts & Lists where
it covers 50 out of 53, 11 out of 12, and 24 out of 26 requests respectively.
The better coverage in API requests is also reflected in service-side code coverage.
Figure 3.5 shows that BFS-Fast performs better (or at least as good) compared to BFS
and RandomWalk across all API families and always reaches its plateau faster than all
other search strategies reache theirs – usually in just few hours. As explained earlier,
the difference between BFS-Fast and BFS is more apparent in API families with many
requests or many possible value combinations per request because BFS-Fast sacrifices
full grammar coverage to scale better.
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Third, we examine RandomWalk. RandomWalk always maintains the smallest
seqSet of exactly one sequence. By construction, RandomWalk sacrifices full grammar
coverage both with respect to all possible request combinations for a given sequence
length and with respect to all posible value renderings of individual requests, and just
tries to incrementally extend the current sequence in seqSet with one random request
from reqSet until no other request can be used because there are no valid dependen-
cies (see Chapter 3.3). After 48 hours, RandomWalk usually explores deeper request
sequences compared to BFS and less deep compared to BFS-Fast. Indeed, in APIs that
contain requests with relatively more value combinations (such as Commits, Issues &
Notes, and Repos & Files) randomly selecting valid values and constructing longer se-
quences than BFS-Fast is unlikely, especially because RandomWalk does not memoize
valid/invalid value combinations after restarts and may produce many duplicate test
cases. By contrast, in User Groups there are 53 requests with only 2 possible value
combinations when, in comparison, in Projects there are 54 requests but with 5 pos-
sible renderings. Consequently, the probability of randomly generating valid and long
sequences is higher in Projects (despite the high number of API requests) and, indeed,
after 1, 341 restarts RandomWalk produces longer sequences than BFS-Fast (sequence
length 40 versus 33).
Regarding RandomWalk request coverage, we observe that it behaves similarly with
BFS-Fast (and better than BFS) in most APIs, except, most notably, for Commits API.
In the later, RandomWalk covers only 10 out of 15 API requests, whereas both BFS
and BFS-Fast cover 15 out of 15 API requests. To understand why RandomWalk
underperforms in the specific API family, we need to analyze the dependencies across
the requests of Commits APIs, model the probability RandomWalk has to cover all
request types in the specific API family, and compare this probability with other APIs.
We clarify that the five request types which have never been covered by Ran-
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domWalk in Commits are all requests that consume three dynamic resource types:
A project-id, a branch-id, and a commit-id, and we will model the probability Ran-
domWalk has to generate at least one sequence that satisfies the dependencies of these
five requests: (1) The producer for project-id is a base parent and has a probability
one to be selected when the sequence length is one; (2) the producer for a branch-
id consumes a project-id and can be selected only after sequence length is two, with
probability 0.25 because three other requests (i.e., create project, delete project, query
project) have valid dependencies when the sequence length is two; (3) the producer
for commit-id consumes a branch-id and can be selected only after sequence length
is three, with probability 0.16 because six other requests (i.e., create project, delete
project, query project, create branch, delete branch, query branch) have valid depen-
dencies when the sequence length is three; (4) finally, each one of the five requests,
that have never been rendered, may be selected when sequence length is four with
probability 0.06 since all fifteen requests now have valid dependencies.
From (1), (2), (3), and (4), the probability to cover render one of the five uncovered
requests using RandomWalk is 0.25*0.16*0.06 or approximately 0.2%. However, the
actual probability in the given time frame of 48 hours is much less than 0.2% because the
above analysis did not consider the time spend—since RandomWalk does not memoize
between restarts—until a valid value combination for each request is found. The same
rationale can be applied to other APIs with uncovered API requests, such as Issues &
Notes or Mastodon Statuses. For example, in Issues & Note (one out of 25 requests
uncovered), with a similar analysis we get that the uncovered request for posting a note
on an issue of a project may be selected with probability 0.05% (without considering the
time spent until valid value combinations are found). Finally, the regarding service-side
code coverage shown in Figure 3.5), we observe that RandomWalk behaves like BFS-
Fast across most APIs. The only expected exception is in Commits (top-left corner)
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where clearly the service-side code coverage achieved with RandomWalk is less than
BFS and BFS-Fast.
Overall, both controlling the size of seqSet when facing broad search spaces due to
large APIs with many requests or when reaching greater depths as well as controlling
the size of seqSet when facing broad search spaces due to complex APIs with request
that have many possible value combinations are both key to delivering good code cov-
erage quickly. However, as shown in Figure 3.5, when running long fuzzing sessions
(e.g., as long as 48 hours) all search strategies plateau in relatively similar incremental
code coverage. In order to go beyond such plateaus when performing stateful REST
API fuzzing, one needs to investigate other types of mutations which are discussed
extensively in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of testing is to find bugs
as quickly as possible, and maximizing code coverage should always be perceived as
heuristic towards reaching that goal. Therefore, next, we investigate the performance
of the three search strategies explicitly with respect to the number of bugs found in a
limited time frame.
Search strategies: Bugs found (Q4)
Lastly, we discuss the number of uniques bugs found by each search strategy across
each API family of three cloud services. We cosider as bug each 500 “Internal Server
Error” incident triggered after executing a sequence and we cluster similar instances
according to the bucketization scheme described in Chapter 3.4. Table 3.4 shows the
sets of bug buckets found by each search strategy after 5 hours and it also shows the
union and intersection of the respective sets to obtain a perspective of complementarity
(and of overlap) regarding the bug-finding capability of each search strategy.
Although previously in this section we reported experiments with longer fuzzing
sessions (up to 48h), here we report experiments with shorter sessions in order to
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Target API Family BFS BFS- Random- Intersection Union
Service Fast Walk
GitLab Commits 5 1 5 1 5
Brances 7 7 7 5 8
Issues & Notes 0 1 1 0 1
User Groups 0 0 2 0 2
Projects 2 1 3 1 3
Repos & Files 2 3 3 2 3
Mastodon Accounts & Lists 0 0 0 0 0
Statuses 1 1 0 0 1
Spree Storefront Cart 1 1 1 1 1
Total 18 15 22 10 24
Table 3.4: Bug buckets found by BFS, BFS-Fast, and RandomWalk. Shows
the the number of bug buckets found by each search strategies after 5h.
demonstrate the effectiveness of each search strategy in a limited time-frame. After
running each search strategy for 5 hours on each API family, RESTler found 24 new
unique bugs accross all services and APIs.
RandomWalk stands out in Table 3.4 by finding the most bugs: 22 compared to 18
and 15 for BFS and BFS-Fast respectively. However, it is particularly intriguing that
service-side code coverage, as shown in Figure 3.5 for each search strategy in the first
five hours, is not always on par with the respective total nummber of bug buckets found
by each search strategy. There are two cases.
First, there are APIs where service-side code coverage and number of bug buckets
found are largely on par. In specific, in Branches all search strategies have almost
identical code coverage and find the same total number of bug buckets; in Issues & Notes
BFS-Fast and RandomWalk find one bug, while BFS finds zero, which is consistent with
the service-side code coverage of the three strategies; in Repos & Files both BFS-Fast
and RandomWalk find three bugs versus two bugs of BFS, which is inline with service-
side code coverage because both BFS-Fast and RandomWalk outperform BFS code
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coverage in the first five hours; in Accounts & Lists all search strategies also have
identical code coverage and find the same number (zero) of bug buckets; in Statuses
BFS and BFS-Fast find one bug bucket, while RandomWalk finds zero. This is also
consistent with service-side code coverage because in the first five hours RandomWalk
underperforms and catchs up with BFS and BFS-Fast after approximately 20 hours;
finally, in Storefront Cart all search strategies find the same number of bug buckets and
their service-side coverage identical as well.
On the other hand, there are APIs where service-side code coverage and number of
bug buckets found are not on par and we explain why. In Commits, it is particularly
intriguing that RandomWalk and BFS find the highest number of bugs compared to
BFS-Fast (five versus one) which is inconsistent with service-side code coverage (see
Figure 3.5, top-left, for the first five hours) where RandomWalk never achieves the
same code-coverage increment with BFS or with BFS-Fast. In addition, we can see
from Table 3.4 that RandomWalk and BFS find exactly the same bug buckets because
the number of the union of bug buckets (five) equals the size of the individual sets
for RandomWalk and BFS. Although this inversion is counter-intuitive at first sight,
it is informative regarding the impact of the trade-off followed by BFS-Fast (which
systematically sacrifices full grammar coverage with respect to all possible requests
combinations for a given sequence length in order to construct longer sequences).
The fact that BFS-Fast covers more API requests and also produces longer se-
quences than RandomWalk (see first row of Table 4.1) but still RandomWalk finds
more bugs, indicates that particularly in Commit APIs sacrificing full grammar cov-
erage with respect to all possible request combinations has a negative impact on the
bug-finding capability of BFS-Fast. To understand why, recall the scenario discussed
earlier, where a user edits (e.g., cherry-pick) a commit on a branch of a project (re-
quired sequence lenght is four). In this scenario, because BFS-Fast attempts to prune
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the search space by appending each request to at most one sequence in SetSeq for
a given sequence length, it ends up discarding all test cases whose third request can
create a commit and therefore it fundamentally cannot exercise functionality related
to editing commits (nor discover any related bugs). One such Commits bug, found by
BFS and RandomWalk but not by BFS-Fast, is discussed in Example 1 of Chapter 3.7.
Similar conclusions regarding the BFS-Fast trade-off can be drawn in User Groups and
Projects where RandomWalk achieves almost identical service-side code coverage with
BFS-Fast (see second row of Figure 3.5) but finds more bugs buckets (two versus zeros
for User Groups and three versus one for Projects).
Overall, within the 5-hours time-frame of our experiments, RandomWalk finds more
bugs than BFS or BFS-Fast despite the fact that it does not always deliver the best
coverage. In the same spirit, although BFS delivers worse coverage than BFS-Fast
Projects, the former still finds more bugs (two versus one). Such inversions stress out
the fact that code coverage increase should not always dictate the selection of a search
strategy: code coverage is a indication of the progress of a search strategy; yet, different
search strategies may have complementary value, especially within large search spaces.
Additionally, it becomes apparent that pruning the search space early on, by sacrificing
grammar coverage with respect to possible request combinations for a given sequence
length, may fundamentally limit bug-finding capability, although it benefits scalability
and allows for greater sequence length.
Indeed, when testing APIs that have never been fuzzed before, exploring a relatively
small depth of the search space (i.e., generating tests cases that consist of a only handful
of API requests) while, at the same time, systematically exploring the breadth of the
search space defined by the possible API request combinations for the given depth (i.e.,
not pruning the breadth of the search space early on) is sufficient to achieve non-trivial
code coverage, exercise rare service-side code paths, and eventually uncover previously-
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unknown errors. Armed with this realization, in Chapter 4.4 we present a new search
strategy (called BFS-Cheap) which combines the best of both worlds and provides a
middle-ground between BFS-Fast and RandomWalk.
3.7 New Bugs Found
During all our fuzzing experiments with RESTler on our local GitLab, Mastodon, and
Spree deployments we found 30 previously-unknown, unique bugs that have now been
fixed. Furthermore, RESTler found handful of bugs in each of the four proprietary
Azure and Office365 cloud services discussed in Chapter 3.5. These bugs range from
mis-handled invalid inputs (e.g., using a wrong ID or enum value), executing operations
in invalid states (e.g., updating a resource that no longer exists), and inconsistent
parameter validations (e.g., using a valid request body with incorrect metadata) and
have all been fixed. To give the reader a flavor of the nature of those bugs, here, we
describe two representative examples. (See [90;91;92;1] for other examples of bugs found.)
Example 1: Bug in Commits API of GitLab. One of the bugs found by RESTler
in the Commits API is triggered when a user tries to cherry-pick a commit to a branch
with an empty name. Due to incomplete input validation, an invalid branch name
can be passed between two different layers of abstraction as follows: The ruby code
that checks if a target branch exists, invokes a native C function whose return value
is expected to be either NULL or an existing entry. However, if an unmatched entry
type (e.g., an empty string) is passed to the native function, an exception is raised.
This exception is unhandled by the higher-level ruby code, and therefore it causes a
500 “Internal Server Error”. The bug can be reproduced by (1) creating a project,
(2) creating a new branch (in addition to master branch which is created by default),
(3) posting a valid commit with action “create” in the branch created in (2), and (4)
cherry-picking the commit to a branch whose name is set to the empty string.
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Example 2: Bug in Branches API of GitLab. Another bug, found by RESTler in
the Branches API, is triggered when a user tries to edit a branch of a recently deleted
project. The bug is due to invalid serialization of operations which results in an database
entry update using an invalid foreign key of a deleted project. Since the project-id (for-
eign key) is not present in the respective “projects” table, a PG::ForeignKeyViolation
exception causes a 500 “Internal Server Error”. The bug can be reproduced by (1)
creating a project, (2) creating a branch, (3) deleting the project created in (1), and
(4) quickly editing the branch of the deleted project.
From the above bug descriptions, we see a two-fold pattern. First, RESTler pro-
duces a sequence that exercises the target service deep enough so that it reaches a
particular valid “state”. Second, while the service is in such a state, RESTler produces
an additional request with an unexpected fuzzed value (e.g., an empty string) or an
unexpected action (e.g., edit a branch of a recently deleted project). Most bugs found
by RESTler require a combination of these two features in order to be found.
3.8 Summary
RESTler is the first automatic tool for stateful fuzzing of cloud services through their
REST APIs. RESTler analyzes a OpenAPI specification of a REST API, and generates
tests by inferring dependencies among request types and by learning invalid request
combinations from the service’s responses. We presented empirical evidence showing
that these techniques are necessary to thoroughly exercise a service while pruning its
large search space of possible request sequences. We also evaluated three different
search strategies on three open-source, production-scale cloud services and found tens




Checking Security Properties of
Cloud Service REST APIs
In this chapter, we describe how stateful REST API fuzzing can be extended to capture
errors beyond the generic class of unhandled exceptions. We introduce four security
rules that define desirable properties of cloud services and describe how RESTler can
be extended with active checkers that generate API request sequences to specifically
test for violations of these rules.
4.1 Background and Motivation
As explained earlier, the target of this dissertation is cloud services accessible through
REST APIs. A REST API is defined as a finite set of requests and each request r is a
tuple of the form ⟨a, t, p, b⟩ where
• a is an authentication token,
• t is the request type,
• p is a resource path, and
• b is the request body.
A request type t is any of the following five REST-allowed values: PUT (create or up-
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date), POST (create or update), GET (read, list or query), DELETE (delete), PATCH
(update). The resource path p is a string identifying a cloud resource and its parent
hierarchy. Typically, p is a (non-empty) sequence matching the regular expression
(/⟨resourceType⟩/⟨resourceName⟩/)+
where resourceType denotes the type of a cloud resource and resourceName is the
specific name of the resource of that type. The last resource named in the path is
typically the specific resource that the request tries to create, access, or delete. The
request body bmay include additional parameters and their values that may be required
or optional for the request to be executed successfully.
For instance, here is a request to get the properties of a specific Azure DNS zone [135]
(shown on multiple lines):







This request is of type GET, its path requires three resource names, namely a subscriptionID,
a resourceGroupName, and a zoneName, and its body denoted by { } is empty.
REST API requests of type PUT or POST typically create new resources, while
DELETE requests destroy existing resources. A request whose execution creates a new
resource of type T is called a producer for the resource type T . A newly created resource
is represented by its identifier, or id for short. Because resources are dynamically
created, we will sometimes call them dynamic objects. A request which requires a
resource name of type T in its path or in its body is called a consumer for the resource
type T . We will sometimes refer to the resource name of type T as the dynamic object
type. In the Azure DNS zone example above, the GET request shown consumes three
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resources of type subscriptions, resourceGroups, and dnsZones respectively, but
does not produce any new resource.
Inside resource paths or request bodies of individual requests, the user is allowed
to specify that some specific values, called fuzzable values, are to be chosen randomly
among a (small finite) set of specific values. For instance, a user might specify that
a given integer value in the body of a request may be, say, either 0, 10, 1000000, or
-10. Such a set of values is called a fuzzing dictionary. Given a request with fuzzable
values, a rendering of that request denotes a mapping of each fuzzable value to a single
concrete value selected in its fuzzing dictionary. Thus, a request with n fuzzable values
which can each take k possible values results in nk possible renderings. A rendering
is called valid if the execution of the corresponding request returns a valid response
(defined in the next paragraph). Users are responsible for identifying values they want
to fuzz and their associated fuzzing dictionaries.
We define the state space of a service as a directed graph where nodes represent
service states and edges are transitions between these. Given a state s of the service,
executing a single request r leads to a successor state s′: this execution is denoted
by s r→ s′. The execution of a request r in a state s is either valid if it triggers a
2xx response, invalid if it triggers a 3xx or 4xx response, or a bug if it triggers a 5xx
response. Given an initial state where no resources exist, the state space of the service
reachable from that initial state can be explored by executing sequences of requests.
Such an exploration is stateful when it attempts to explore service states that are
reachable only using sequences of multiple requests: earlier requests in a sequence may
produce resources that are consumed in subsequent requests in that sequence in order
to exercise more requests and reach deeper service states. State-space exploration can
be performed using various search strategies, e.g., a systematic Breadth First Search
(BFS) or a random search, as explained earlier in Chapter 3. We wil call the default
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BFS state-space exploration algorithm the main driver of stateful REST API fuzzing.
In addition to the generic 5xx-related bugs that can be detected by baseline stateful
REST API fuzzing, in this chapter we also introduce four security rules that capture
desirable properties of REST APIs and services. We treat violations of these rules as
new classes of bugs. Briefly, these rules are:
• Use-after-free rule. A resource that has been deleted must no longer be acces-
sible.
• Resource-leak rule. A resource that was not created successfully must not be
accessible and must not “leak” any side-effect in the backend service state.
• Resource-hierarchy rule. A child resource of a parent resource must not be
accessible from another parent resource.
• User-namespace rule. A resource created in a user namespace must not be
accessible from another user namespace.
Violations of such rules might allow an attacker to hijack cloud resources or bypass quo-
tas (Elevation-of-Privilege attack), or to steal information from other users (Information-
Disclosure attack), or to corrupt the backend service state so that it no longer operates
properly (Denial-of-Service attack). These rules and the ramifications of such viola-
tions are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.2. Furthermore, in Chapter 4.3 we show how
RESTler can be extended with active property checkers that est and detect violations
of such rules.
4.2 REST API Security Properties
We introduce four security rules that capture desirable properties of REST APIs and
services. We illustrate each rule with an example and discuss its security implications.
All four rules are inspired by past real bugs in deployed cloud services, which were
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found either by manual penetration testing or by root cause analysis of customer-visible
incidents. Examples of new, previously-unknown bugs we found as rule violations in
deployed production Azure and Office-365 services are presented later in Chapter 4.6.
Use-after-free rule. A resource that has been deleted must not be accessible. In
other words, after a successful DELETE operation on any resource, any subsequent
operation – like read, update, or delete – on that resource must fail.
For example, after issuing a DELETE request to URI /users/user-id1 in order to
delete the account with identifier user-id1, all subsequent attempts to use user-id1
must fail and thus return a “404 Not Found” HTTP status code in their response.
A use-after-free violation occurs when a resource that has been deleted still remains
accessible through the API. This must never happen. It is a clear bug that may lead
to bypassing resource quotas and corrupting the service backend state.
Resource-leak rule. A resource that was not successfully created must not be ac-
cessible, and must not “leak” any associated resources in the backend service state.
In other words, if the execution of a PUT or POST request to create a new resource
fails (for any reason), any subsequent operation on that resource must also fail with a
4xx response. Furthermore, no side-effects associated with successful creation of that
resource type must occur in the backend service state and be visible to the user. For
instance, a failed-to-be-created resource must not be counted in the user’s resource
counter towards service quotas, and the name of the failed-to-be-created resource must
be reusable by the user.
As an example, after issuing a malformed PUT request to create URI /users/user-id1,
a 4xx response must be received. Any subsequent request to access (read, update, or
delete) this URI must also fail.
A resource-leak violation occurs when a resource that was not successfully created
nevertheless “leaks” some side-effect in the backend service state. For instance, the
57
resource may be listed by a subsequent GET request, yet it cannot be deleted with a
DELETE request, or subsequent attempts to re-create this resource return “409 Con-
flict” responses. Such violations must never happen, as they may have unintended
consequences on the capacity for that resource type (e.g., if resource quota limits are
reached and no new resources can be created) and on the performance of the service
(e.g., due to unnecessarily large database tables).
Resource-hierarchy rule. A child resource of a parent resource must not be accessible
from another parent resource. In other words, if a resource child is successfully created
from a resource parent and identified as such in service resource paths of the form
⟨parentType⟩/parent/⟨childType⟩/child/, the child resource must not be accessible
(i.e., must not be successfully read, updated or deleted) when substituting the parent
resource by any other parent resource.
For example, after issuing POST requests to URIs /users/user-id1,
/users/user-id2, and /users/user-id1/reports/report-id1 to create users
user-id1, user-id2, and then add report report-id1 to user user-id1, subsequent
requests to URI /users/user-id2/reports/report-id1 must fail since, according to
the resource-hierarchy rule, report report-id1 belongs to user user-id1 but not to
user user-id2.
A resource-hierarchy violation occurs when a sub-resource originally created from
a parent resource is accessible from a different parent resource with no parent-child
relationship. When such violations are possible, an attacker might be able to provide
an unauthorized parent object identifier (e.g., user-id3), and then steal (read) or hijack
(write) an unauthorized child object (e.g., report-id1). Resource-hierarchy violations
are clear bugs, are potentially dangerous, and must never happen.
User-namespace rule. A resource created in a user namespace must not be acces-
sible from another user namespace. In the context of REST APIs, we consider user
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namespaces defined by the user token used to interact with the API (e.g., OAUTH
token-based authentication [145]).
For example, after issuing a POST request to create URI /users/user-id1 using
token token-of-user-id1, resource user-id1 must not be accessible using another
token token-of-user-id2 of another user.
A user namespace violation occurs when a resource created within the namespace of
one user is accessible from within the namespace of another user. If such a violation ever
occurs, an attacker might be able to execute REST API requests using an unauthorized
authentication token, and perform unauthorized operations on resources belonging to
another (victim) user.
4.3 Active Checkers for REST API Security
Properties
Ideally, the desired property for any REST API is that none of the violations defined
in Chapter 4.2 occur. In practice, however, there may be violations and we implement
active checkers to monitor for those violations. An active checker monitors the state
space exploration performed by the main driver of stateful REST API fuzzing and
suggests new tests to assert that specific rules are not violated. Thus, an active checker
augments the search space by executing new tests targeted at violating specific rules. In
contrast, a passive checker monitors the search performed by the main driver without
executing new tests. Hence, a passive checker does not augment the state space explored
by stateful REST API fuzzing.
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1 Inputs: seq, global_cache, reqCollection
2 # Retrieve the object types consumed by the last request and
3 # locally store the most recent object id of the last object type.
4 n = seq.length
5 req_obj_types = CONSUMES(seq[n])
6 # Only the id of the last object is kept, since this is the
7 # object actually deleted.
8 target_obj_type = req_obj_types[−1]
9 target_obj_id = global_cache[target_obj_type]
10 # Use the latest value of the deleted object and execute
11 # any request that type−checks.
12 for req in reqCollection:
13 # Only consider requests that typecheck.
14 if target_obj_type not in CONSUMES(req)
15 continue
16 # Restore id of deleted object.
17 global_cache[target_obj_type] = target_obj_id
18 # Execute request on deleted object.
19 EXECUTE(req)
20 assert ’’HTTP status code is 4xx’’
21 if mode != ’exhaustive’:
22 break
Figure 4.1: Use-after-free checker. Shows the implementation of the use-after-free
checker.
We design active checkers following a modular style, based on two principles:
1. Checkers are independent from the main driver of stateful REST API fuzzing and
do not affect its state space exploration.
2. Checkers are independent from each other and generate tests by analyzing the
requests executed by the main driver, excluding those executed by other checkers.
We enforce the first principle by running all the checkers whenever the main driver has
finished executing a new test case. We enforce the second principle by prioritizing the
order of applying checkers based on their semantics, so that they operate on different
test cases and do not interfere with each other (more on this later in this section). In
what follows, we present implementation details of each checker as well as optimizations
to limit state-space explosion.
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1 Inputs: seq, global_cache, reqCollection
2 # Retrieve the object types produced by the whole sequence and by
3 # the last request separately to perform type checking later on.
4 seq_obj_types = PRODUCES(seq)
5 target_obj_types = PRODUCES(seq[−1])
6 for target_obj_type in target_obj_types:
7 for guessed_value in GUESS(target_obj_type):
8 global_cache[target_obj_type] = guessed_value
9 for req in reqCollection:
10 # Skip consumers that don’t consume the target type.
11 if CONSUMES(req) != target_obj_type:
12 continue
13 # Skip requests that don’t typecheck.
14 if CONSUMES(req) − seq_obj_types:
15 continue
16 # Execute the request accessing the ’’guessed’’ object id.
17 EXECUTE(req)
18 assert ’’HTTP status code in 4xx class’’
19 if mode != ’exhaustive’:
20 break
Figure 4.2: Resource-leak checker. Shows the implementation of the resource-
leakage checker.
Use-after-free checker. The implementation of the use-after-free rule checker is
described in Figure 4.1 in python-like notation. The algorithm is called after the main
driver executes a DELETE request (see Figure 3.3) and takes three inputs: a sequence
seq of requests, which is the latest test case executed by the main driver; the global
cache of dynamic objects, denoted global_cache, which contains the most recent object
types and ids for the dynamic objects created so far; and the request collection, denoted
reqCollection, which is the set of all available API requests.
First, the types of the dynamic objects consumed by the last request are retrieved
(line 5) and the id of the last object type, denoted target_obj_type, is stored in
a temporary variable, denoted target_obj_id. Although the last request may be
consuming more than one object type, we consider the last type in req_object_types
as the actual type of the deleted object. (For example, a DELETE request on the URI
/users/userId1/reports/reportId1 consumes two object types (users and reports)
but only deletes report objects.) After this initial setup, the for-loop (line 12) iterates
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over all requests available in reqCollection and skips those that do not consume the
target object type (line 14). Once a request, req, that consumes the target object type
is found, the target object id is restored in the global cache of dynamic objects (line 17)
and is therefore used by the function EXECUTE (line 19) which executes request
req. Note that the target object id is repeatedly restored in the global cache because
the function EXECUTE uses object ids available in global_cache when executing a
request. If any of these requests succeeds, line 20 will trigger a use-after-free violation
(see Chapter 4.2). or assert that no such violation occurs for the given request sequence
.
Finally, in order to limit the number of additional tests generated for each request
sequence, the inner loop (optionally) terminates when one request for each target object
type is found (line 21). This option is used if the variable mode is not set to value
exhaustive. We present detailed experimental results regarding the impact of this
optimization in Chapter 4.5.
Resource-leak checker. The resource-leak rule checker is described in Figure 4.2.
The algorithm takes the same three inputs as the use-after-free checker. This checker
operates on request sequences executed by the main driver whose last request led to an
invalid HTTP status code in the response (see Figure 3.3).
The intuition behind this design decision is that when an invalid status code is
returned and the last request was attempting to create one or several new resources
(i.e., the last request is a resource producer), the requested dynamic objects must not
be created in the backend state; otherwise, a leak occurs: (some of these) dynamic
objects may have been created in the backend state yet the user may not have access
to these through the API.
Initially, the algorithm identifies the dynamic object types produced by the
whole sequence, denoted seq_obj_types, and produced by the last request, denoted
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1 Inputs: seq, global_cache
2 # Record the object types consumed by the last request
3 # as well as those of all predecessor requests.
4 n = seq.length
5 last_request = seq[n]
6 target_obj_types = CONSUMES(seq[n])
7 predecessor_obj_types = CONSUMES(seq[:n])
8 # Retrieve the most recent id of each child object consumed
9 # only by the last request. These are the objects whose
10 # hierarchy we will try to violate.
11 local_cache = {}
12 for obj_type in target_obj_types − predecessor_obj_types:
13 local_cache[obj_type] = global_cache[obj_type]
14 # Render sequence up to before the last request
15 EXECUTE(seq, n−1)
16 # Restore old children object ids that do NOT belong to
17 # the current parent ids and must NOT be accessible from those.
18 for obj_type in local_cache:
19 global_cache[obj_type] = local_cache[obj_type]
20 EXECUTE(last_request)
21 assert ’’HTTP status code is 4xx’’
Figure 4.3: Resource-hierarchy checker. Shows the implementation of the resource-
hierarchy checker.
target_obj_types (lines 4 and 5). The main logic of the algorithm is implemented in
three nested for loops. The first loop (line 6) iterates over all object types produced
by the last request. The second loop (line 7) iterates over object ids “guessed” for the
current object type for which an invalid HTTP status code was received. The function
GUESS takes as argument an object type and returns a set of possible object ids match-
ing this type and which were not created successfully. For instance, if the creation of
a dynamic object with object type “x” and object id “objx1” fails through the API
(according to the response received), the checker will attempt to execute any request
that consumes the object type “x” and assert it fails when using the object id “objx1”.
Note that the total number of guessed values per object id is limited to a user-provided
parameter value in order to avoid an explosion in the number of additional tests.
In line 8, a guessed object-id value is temporarily added to the global cache of
properly-created dynamic objects. Then the inner loop (line 9) iterates over all requests
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in reqCollection to find requests that are executable (given the object types produced
by the current sequence) and that consume the given target object type. These requests
are executed (line 17) using the “guessed” object ids previously registered in the global
cache. This way, the algorithm tries to trigger a resource-leak violation (see Chapter
4.2) or asserts that no such violation occurs for the given sequence (line 18).
Finally, in order to limit the number of additional tests generated for each input
sequence, the inner loop (optionally) terminates when one request for each guessed
object is found (line 19). We evaluate this optimization in Chapter 4.5.
Resource-hierarchy checker. The implementation of the resource-hierarchy rule
checker is described in Figure 4.3. The algorithm takes two inputs: a sequence of
requests, denoted seq, which is the latest test case executed by the main driver and
the current global cache of dynamic objects, denoted global_cache.
First, the algorithm records the object types consumed by the last request of the cur-
rent sequence, denoted target_obj_types (line 6), and the object types consumed by
all other requests of the sequence before the last request, denoted predecessor_obj_types
(line 7). Afterwards, the ids of the objects consumed only by the last request are stored
locally (lines 12 and 13). These are the child objects whose hierarchy the checker will
try to violate by executing requests that try to access them using invalid parent objects.
To this end, in line 15, the current sequence is executed up to (and not including) the
last request. Finally, the old child object ids are restored (lines 18 and 19) and the
last request is executed using the old child object ids on top of new parent object ids
(line 20). These parent object ids are not proper parent objects of the restored child
object ids. This way, the algorithm tries to trigger a resource-hierarchy violation (see
Chapter 4.2) or asserts that no such violation occurs for the given request sequence
(line 21).
User-namespace checker. The implementation of the user namespace rule checker
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1 Inputs: seq, global_cache
2 # Because this checker is applied last, we need to re−render the
3 # current sequence in order to propagate proper object ids.
4 EXECUTE(seq)
5 # Retrieve the object types consumed by the whole sequence and
6 # locally store the most recent object ids of those objects.
7 target_obj_types = CONSUMES(seq)
8 local_cache = {}
9 for obj_type in target_obj_types:
10 local_cache[obj_type] = global_cache[obj_type]
11 for i, req in enumerate(seq):
12 # If not in exhaustive mode, render only the last request.
13 if mode != ’exhaustive’ and i != seq.length:
14 continue
15 # Skip requests that are not consumers.
16 if not CONSUMES(req):
17 continue
18 # Reset global cache of object ids and use an alternate (attacker)
19 # token to execute the sequence up to before the last request.
20 global_cache.reset()
21 EXECUTE(seq − req, use_attacker_token)
22 # Restore the object ids belonging to the benign user and try to hijack
23 # them by executing the last request using an attacker token which is
24 # not authorized for those object ids.
25 for obj_type in local_cache:
26 global_cache[obj_type] = local_cache[obj_type]
27 EXECUTE(req, use_attacker_token)
28 assert ’’HTTP status code is 4xx’’
Figure 4.4: User-namespace checker. Shows the implementation of the user-
namespace checker.
is described in Figure 4.4, in python-like notation. The algorithm takes three inputs:
a sequence of requests, denoted seq, which is the latest test case executed by the main
driver; the global cache of dynamic objects, denoted global_cache, which contains
the most recent object types and ids for the dynamic objects created so far; and an
attacker token (an alternate token representing the attacker’s identity, which must not
have access to the same resources as the token used by the main driver), denoted
attacker_token.
First, since the user namespace checker is applied last, and it may be affected by
other checkers applied previously, the input sequence is re-rendered (line 4) to prevent
interference with previously applied checkers, and, in particular, ensure that consistent
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object ids exist in global_cache. Then, the algorithm records the object types pro-
duced by the last request of the current sequence, denoted target_obj_types (line 7).
The object ids of the dynamic objects produced by the current sequence are then stored
locally (lines 9 and 10). Afterwards, the outer loop (line 11) iterates over the current
sequence until the first request, denoted req, which consumes some object type is found
(lines 16 and 17).
Note the usual optimization to limit the size of the additional test cases generated
for each input sequence (line 14). Once a request req that consumes some object type
is found, the global cache of object ids is reset (line 20) and the current sequence is
executed up to before req using the attacker_token (line 21). This constructs an
attacker namespace containing predecessor dynamic objects. Afterwards, the object
ids belonging to the victim user are restored (lines 25 and 26) and req is executed
using the attacker’s identity (line 27).
To hijack the objects belonging to a victim user, req is then executed with the
attacker’s identity after restoring the victim’s object ids. If the request succeeds, a user
namespace violation (see Chapter 4.2) has occurred for the current sequence (line 28).
Combining All Checkers
The four checkers defined in the previous section are executed as follows. Whenever
the stateful REST API fuzzer reaches a new state (as defined in Chapter 4.1), its main
driver calls the code shown in Figure 3.3. Depending on the last request executed, this
code activates the checkers that are applicable to the current state. We now discuss
important properties of these checkers and of their combination.
Extending stateful REST API fuzzing. The checkers extend the main driver of
baseline stateful REST API fuzzing in two ways: (1) they extend the state space by
executing additional tests and (2) they check for responses other than 5xx and can
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1 Inputs: seq, global_cache, reqCollection
2 # Execute the checkers after the main driver.
3 n = seq.length
4 if seq[n].http_type == ’’DELETE’’:
5 UseAfterFreeChecker(seq, global_cache, reqCollection)
6 else:
7 if seq[n].http_response == ’’4xx’’:




Figure 4.5: Checkers dispatcher. Shows the implementation of the checkers dis-
patcher.
flag unexpected 2xx responses as rule-violation bugs. Thus, they clearly increase the
bug-finding capabilities of the main driver: they can find bugs that the main driver
alone would not find.
Active property checking versus passive monitoring. As discussed earlier, the
checkers we define extend the search space explored by the main driver with additional
test cases aimed at triggering and detecting specific rule violations. In contrast, passive
runtime monitoring of these rules in conjunction with the main driver, i.e., without
executing those new tests, would likely be unable to detect rule violations. Specifically,
use-after-free and resource-leak rule violations would likely not be detected with passive
monitoring alone because the default state space exploration, performed by the main
driver, would likely not attempt to re-use deleted resources or resources after a failure,
respectively. Similarly, resource-hierarchy and user-namespace rule violations would
not be detected by passive monitoring either because the baseline main driver does not
attempt to substitute object identifiers or authentication tokens, respectively. In other
words, the additional test cases generated by the checkers are necessary to find rule
violations and are not redundant with respect to non-checker tests.
Complementarity among the checkers. The four checkers we define complement
each other: no two checkers will ever generate the same new tests, by construction,
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because their preconditions are all mutually exclusive. First, the use-after-free checker
is the only checker activated by request sequences that end in a DELETE request.
Second, the resource-leak checker is the only checker activated when the last request
executed returns an invalid HTTP status code. Third, the resource-ownership checker
is the only checker activated on request sequences with valid renderings that do not
end in a DELETE request. Fourth and last, the user-namespace checker executed tests
using an attacker token different from the authentication token used by the main driver
and all other checkers, so it clearly extends the state space in an orthogonal dimension.
4.4 Search Strategies for Active Checkers
The main search strategy used for test generation in stateful REST API fuzzing is a
Breadth First Search (BFS) in the state space defined by all possible request sequences.
This search strategy provides full grammar coverage both with respect to all possible
renderings of each individual request and with respect to all possible request sequence
combinations of up to a given sequence length. However, since the search space explored
by BFS is typically enormous, the search does not scale well as the sequence length
increases. On the other hand, RandomWalk and BFS-Fast (discussed in Chapter 3.3)
scale better than BFS (as shown in Chapter 3.6) but do not explore all request sequences
of a given sequence length. Unfortunately, this limits the number of violations the
security checkers can actively check for . To alleviate this, we introduce a new search
strategy, called BFS-Cheap.
BFS-Cheap follows the inverse trade-off of BFS-Fast: it sacrifices full coverage of all
possible request renderings at every state but explores all possible request sequences for
a given sequence length, albeit not with all possible renderings. Specifically, given a set
of sequences of length n, called seqSet, and a set of requests, called reqCollection,
BFS-Cheap appends each req ∈ reqCollection at the end of seq, executes the new
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sequence while considering the possible renderings of req, and adds to seqSet at most
one valid (if any) and one invalid (if any) sequence renderings.
Valid renderings are used by the use-after-free, resource-hierarchy, and user-namespace
checkers, while invalid renderings are used by the resource-leak checker. In practive,
BFS-Cheap corresponds to one simple change in the algorithm of Figure 3.3: In line 31
of function RENDER we add a break statement that will stop the continuous rendering
as soon as the last request of each test sequence has been executed with one valid and
one invalid rendering.
BFS-Cheap thus provides a middle-ground between BFS and BFS-Fast (see Chapter
4.5 for experimental evaluation). It explores all possible request sequences up to a given
sequence length (like BFS) and adds at most two new renderings for each sequence in
order to avoid an enormous seqSet (like BFS-Fast). Two new renderings per sequence
explored allow for active checking of all the security rules defined in Chapter 4.2 while
maintaining a tractable number of sequences in seqSet as sequence length increases.
The suffix “cheap” comes from the fact BFS-Cheap is a cheaper version of BFS
where at most one valid rendering is added to the BFS “frontier” setSeq for each
new sequence. This leads to the creation of fewer resources than those created when
all valid renderings of each request sequence are explored, as in BFS. For instance,
imagine a request definition with an enum type describing ten different flavours of the
same resource type. BFS-Cheap will stop creating resources once one resource of one
flavour is successfully created. In contrast, BFS and BFS-Fast, will create ten resources
of the same type with ten different flavours.
Bug Bucketization
In the context of active checkers, we define “bugs” as rule violations. Each bug is asso-
ciated with the request sequence that was executed to trigger it. Given this property,
69
we use the following procedure to create per-checker bug buckets:
Whenever a new bug is found, compute all non-empty suffixes of the re-
quest sequence that triggers the bug, starting with the smallest one. If a
suffix exists in a previously-recorded bug bucket, add the new sequence to
that existing bug bucket. Otherwise, create a new bug bucket for the new
sequence.
This bug bucketization scheme is the same as the one in Chapter 3 but, here, we
maintain separate, per-checker bug buckets because the failure conditions are defined
differently for each rule. Each bug will always be triggered by one checker for a specific
sequence length (because of checker complementarity), except for “500 Internal Server
Error” bugs which may be triggered by both the main driver and checkers. For 500
bugs, each sequence will be added only once to the bug bucket of either the main driver
or checker that triggered it first.
4.5 Evaluation
In this section, we report results of experiments with three proprietary and there open-
source cloud services. First, we compare the three search strategies described in Chapter
4.4 and then we present results showing the number of rule violations reported by
each checker on the three proprietary cloud services as well as the impact of various
optimizations introduced in Chapter 4.3.
Experimental Setup
We experiment with two kinds of services, described next: three proprietary Azure and
Office365 services, and three open-source cloud services.
Proprietary cloud services. We report results of experiments performed with three
cloud services, whose names are anonymized (to avoid targeting them): Azure A and
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Azure B are two Azure [12] resource management services, and O-365 C is an Office365 [28]
messaging service. The number of requests in the REST API of each of these three
services ranges from 13 to 19 requests. We selected those three services because their
size and complexity are representative among the cloud services we analyzed. So far,
we have performed similar experiments with about a dozen production services, and
our general experience with these other services is summarized in Chapter 4.6.
Every service discussed here has a publicly-available OpenAPI specification [13]. For
each service, we compile its specification to produce a RESTler test-generation gram-
mar. For a given service and API, the same grammar and fuzzing dictionaries were
used across all the experiments reported in this section. There is no randomness in the
renderings generated. Each fuzzing session lasts one hour and we use a PC connected
to the internet and a valid service subscription that allows access to each service API.
No other special test setup or service knowledge was required. As in Chapter RESTler-
sec:restler:evaluation, we use a garbage-collector that deletes no-longer-used resources
(dynamic objects) in order to avoid exceeding service quota limits.
Since we fuzz production services already deployed and accessible to anyone with
a valid subscription, we have no visibility to what happens inside the backend of each
service. Our fuzzing 1-h fuzzing sessions only observe the HTTP status codes of the
responses it receives. All client-side requests are sent over the internet to the target
services, and responses are parsed when received. We do not control the deployment
of these services. Hence, the experiments reported are not fully controlled. Yet, we
performed these experiments several times and the results did not vary significantly.
Open-source cloud services. We also report results on APIs of three open-source
cloud services, namely GitLab, Mastodon, and Spree. The characteristics of these APIs
are show in Table 3.1 of the previous chapter. Since these services are open-source, we








UseAftFr Leak Hier NameSp
Azure A 13 BFS 3 3255 48.1% 11.5% 1.5% 0.1% 38.8%
BFS-Chp 4 4050 55.0% 10.0% 0.8% 2.4% 31.8%
BFS-Fast 9 4347 59.2% 15.5% 0.2% 0.1% 25.1%
Azure B 19 BFS 5 7721 46.4% 3.6% 0.4% 0.2% 49.4%
BFS-Chp 5 7979 46.2% 3.5% 0.4% 0.2% 49.7%
BFS-Fast 40 17416 65.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 34.3%
O-365 C 18 BFS 3 11693 89.4% 0.0% 1.0% 0.1% 9.5%
BFS-Chp 4 10982 95.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 4.0%
BFS-Fast 33 18120 66.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 33.0%
Table 4.1: Comparison of BFS, BFS-Fast and BFS-Cheap on proprietary
cloud services. Shows the maximum sequence length (Max Len.), the number of
requests sent (Tests), and the percentage of tests generated by the main driver (Main)
and by the four checkers individually with each search strategy after 1 hour of fuzzing.
The second column shows the total number of requests in each API family.
fuzz each one for one hour. Although we have not yet found any violations of security
properties on the above open-source cloud services, we present experimental evaluation
regarding various performance optimizations of active checkers in order to gain a more
comprehensive insight across both proprietary and open-source services.
Comparing Search Strategies
In this subsection, we compare BFS-Cheap against and BFS-Fast. First, we report
results on proprietary cloud services, and then, we complement these results with similar
experiments on open-source cloud services.
Proprietary cloud services. Table 4.1 shows individual experiments with the three
search strategies on each service, over a fixed time budget of one hour per experiment.
For each experiment, we report the total number of requests in the API (Total Req.),
the maximum sequence length generated (Max Len.), the total number of requests sent
(Tests), the percentage of the requests sent by the main driver (Main) as well as the








UseAftFr Leak Hier NmSp
Commits 15 (*11) BFS 4 8300 26.2% 45.7% 11.7% 2.6% 13.6%
BFS-Chp 5 4867 55.5% 17.0% 7.47% 0.8% 19.0%
BFS-Fast 7 3964 45.9% 11.2% 0.98% 15.1% 26.6%
Branches 8 (*2) BFS 5 5848 42.2% 7.98% 11.3% 2.4% 35.9%
BFS-Chp 5 5545 53.9% 4.47% 11.0% 1.7% 28.7%
BFS-Fast 21 4657 54.5% 1.07% 0.27% 0.25% 43.8%
Issues/Nts 25 (*20) BFS 2 1711 30.2% 6.31% 50.4% 0.0% 12.9%
BFS-Chp 4 5519 18.8% 70.6% 0.41% 0.5% 9.58%
BFS-Fast 3 3255 37.3% 3.3% 25.4% 9.03% 24.9%
Groups 53 (*2) BFS 2 957 65.7% 0.10% 0.0 % 0.0% 34.1%
BFS-Chp 3 1314 57.0% 1.90% 0.0 % 0.0% 41.0%
BFS-Fast 4 1230 60.8% 0.48% 0.0 % 1.7% 36.9%
Projects 54 (*5) BFS 2 856 99.1% 0.11% 0.0 % 0.0% 0.70%
BFS-Chp 3 1379 57.3% 7.75% 0.0 % 0.0% 34.8%
BFS-Fast 4 3173 55.0% 0.37% 0.0 % 6.7% 37.8%
Repos/Files 12 (*22) BFS 3 16637 16.1% 8.76% 71.0% 0.0% 4.03%
BFS-Chp 5 7219 65.7% 23.4% 2.46% 0.2% 8.13%
BFS-Fast 4 2167 28.8% 11.8% 24.3% 4.9% 30.0%
Acc./Lists 26 (*3) BFS 3 62322 21.3% 0.0 % 78.6% 0.0% 0.0 %
BFS-Chp 5 22443 77.9% 0.10% 19.7% 2.2% 0.0 %
BFS-Fast 14 28007 66.6% 0.06% 11.5% 21.% 0.0 %
Statuses 18 (*19) BFS 2 96640 10.6% 0.0 % 89.3% 0.0% 0.0 %
BFS-Chp 4 18247 96.1% 0.07% 2.93% 0.8% 0.0 %
BFS-Fast 8 69280 24.1% 0.00% 75.3% 0.48% 0.0 %
Cart 8 (*11) BFS 4 11673 98.3% 0.0 % 0.0 % 1.6% 0.0 %
BFS-Chp 5 4527 92.0% 2.38% 0.0 % 5.5% 0.0 %
BFS-Fast 6 1702 72.1% 9.51% 0.0 % 18.3% 0.0 %
Table 4.2: Comparison of BFS, BFS-Fast and BFS-Cheap on open-source
cloud services. Shows the maximum sequence length (Max Len.), the number of
requests sent (Tests), and the percentage of tests generated by the main driver (Main)
and by the four checkers individually with each search strategy after 1 hour of fuzzing.
The second column shows the total number of requests in each API family as well as
the average number of primitive value combinations for the requests of each API family.
Table 4.1 clearly shows that, for all services, BFS reaches the smallest depth, BFS-
Fast reaches the largest depth, and BFS-Cheap provides a trade-off between these
two extremes, while being closer to BFS than BFS-Fast. The total number of tests
generated varies across services, depending on the speed of the responses received from
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each service. For any given service, this number remains roughly similar except for BFS-
FAST with Azure B and O-365 C where the total number of tests increases significantly.
For O-365 C, this increase seems to be due to a significantly lower number of failed
requests generated by BFS-FAST for these two services compared to BFS and BFS-
Cheap. Such failed requests are sent back to the client (our fuzzer) with larger time
delays. Delaying responses to failed requests is a well-known mechanism used by services
to throttle future requests (i.e., to try to slow them down). On Azure B, BFS-Fast
executes more tests because its request sequences are deeper but include many DELETE
requests which are faster to execute (their responses are received almost instantly):
BFS-Fast executes about 9 times more DELETE requests than BFS or BFS-Cheap.
The total percentage of checker tests (Checkers) is the highest for BFS and the
lowest for BFS-FAST, while BFS-Cheap is again in between. Indeed, while BFS-Fast
generates the largest number of tests, its search space is pruned and activates checkers
less often, as discussed in Chapter 4.4—this is the precise motivation for introducing
BFS-Cheap in that section. An exception is the 33% spike in checker-generated tests
by BFS-FAST for O-365 C. This spike seems to be due to a larger number of successful
requests (see the previous paragraph), which in turn led to more checker tests.
From the individual checker statistics in Table 4.1, we observe that the number of
tests they each generate varies from service to service. This number depends on the
number of DELETE requests executed for the use-after-free checker, the number of failed
resource-creation requests for the resource-leak checker, and the depth of the object
hierarchy for the resource-hierarchy checker. In contrast, the user-namespace checker
is triggered more consistently more often and contributes the largest percentage of
checker-generated tests.
Open-source cloud services. Table 4.2 shows experiments with nine API families of
GitLab, Mastodon, and Spree for the three search strategies over a fixed time budget of
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one hour per experiment. For each experiment, we report the total number of requests
in the API (Total Req.) as well as the average number of available primitive value
combinations for each request, the maximum sequence length generated (Max Len.),
the total number of requests sent (Tests), the percentage of the requests sent by the
main driver (Main) and the individual contribution of each checker.
First, across most APIs BFS-Cheap provides a middle-ground between BFS and
BFS-Fast, except for Issues & Notes and Repos & Files. This is expected because of
the design trade-off the two optimizations follow. Recall from Chapter 3.3 that BFS-
Fast provides full grammar coverage with respect to all possible value renderings of
each individual request but sacrifices full grammar coverage with respect to all possible
request combinations of a given sequence length. Whereas, BFS-Cheap follow the in-
verse trade-off. The two particular APIs (i.e., Issues & Notes and Repos & Files) where
BFS-Cheap manages to construct deeper sequences than BFS-Fast have one common
characteristic: they both have a relatively higher average number of possible value
combinations for each individual request type. Consequently, BFS-Fast, which pro-
vides full grammar coverage with respect to primitive value combinations of individual
requests, ends up exercising a broader space and lacks in depth achieved. By contrast,
the breadth of BFS-Cheap for each individual request is limited to two (one valid and
one invalid rendering), and thus, a relative better depth is achieved.
Second, we compare the three search strategies regarding the total number of tests
generated from the main driver versus from the checkers. BFS-Cheap, in comparison
with BFS, allows for relatively more checker tests in Issues & Notes, User Groups,
Projects, and Storefront Cart. In Issues & Notes BFS-Cheap leads to more use-after-
free tests (70% versus 6%); in User Groups BFS-Cheap lead to more namespace tests
(41% versus 34%); in Projects it leads to more use-after-free and more namespace tests




Tests Main Main UseAftFr Leak Hier NmSp
Azure A 13 optimized 4050 55.0% 4 3 0 0 0
exhaustive 2174 44.5% 4 3 0 0 0
Azure B 19 optimized 7979 46.2% 0 0 1 0 0
exhaustive 9031 36.1% 0 0 1 0 0
O-365 C 18 optimized 10982 95.9% 1 0 0 1 0
exhaustive 11724 88.6% 0 0 0 1 0
Table 4.3: Comparison of modes optimized and exhaustive of BFS-Cheap on
proprietary cloud services. Shows the number of requests sent in 1 hour (Tests)
with BFS-Cheap, the percentage of tests generated by the main driver, and the number
of bug buckets found by the main driver and each of the four checkers. Optimized finds
all the bugs found by exhaustive but its main driver explores more states faster given a
fixed test budget (1 hour).
more use-after-free and hierarchy tests (2% versus 0% and 5% versus 1% respectively).
BFS-Cheap, in comparison with BFS-Fast, allows for relatively more checker tests in
Branches, Issues & Notes, and User Groups. In Branches BFS-Cheap leads to more
use-after-free and leakage checks (4% versus 1% and 11% versus 0.2% respectively); in
Issues & Notes BFS-Cheap leads to more use-after-free checks (70% versus 3%); and
in User Groups BFS-Cheap leads to more use-after-free and namespace checks (1.9%
versus 0.4% and 41% versus 36% respectively);
Overall, the number of additional tests generated by the checkers is non-trivial since
the checkers actively extend the state space explored by stateful REST API fuzzing.
Yet, these numbers would have been much more imbalanced (more checker tests) with-
out the optimizations discussed at the end of Chapter 3.3. Next, we present experi-
mental results regarding the impact of these optimizations on the total number of tests






UseAftFr Leak Hier NmSp
Commits 15 (*11) optimized 4867 55.5% 17.0% 7.4% 0.8% 19.0%
exhaustive 6144 43.4% 15.3% 11.0% 0.6% 29.5%
Branches 8 (*2) optimized 5545 53.9% 4.47% 11.0% 1.7% 28.7%
exhaustive 6614 33.3% 6.1% 25.9% 0.5% 33.9%
Issues/Nts 25 (*20) optimized 5519 18.8% 70.6% 0.4% 0.5% 9.5%
exhaustive 6853 11.9% 78.2% 0.3% 0.4% 9.1%
Groups 53 (*2) optimized 1314 57.0% 1.9% 0.0 % 0.0% 41.0%
exhaustive 1426 45.8% 6.1% 0.0 % 0.0% 48.0%
Projects 54 (*5) optimized 1379 57.3% 7.7% 0.0 % 0.0% 34.8%
exhaustive 5072 15.0% 67.6% 0.0 % 0.0% 17.3%
Repos/Files 12 (*22) optimized 7219 65.7% 23.4% 2.4% 0.2% 8.1%
exhaustive 9363 41.1% 33.1% 8.1% 0.4% 17.1%
Acc./Lists 26 (*3) optimized 22443 77.9% 0.1% 19.7% 2.2% 0.0%
exhaustive 56900 26.7% 0.1% 72.1% 0.8% 0.0%
Statuses 18 (*19) optimized 18247 96.1% 0.0% 2.9% 0.8% 0.0%
exhaustive 21986 84.2% 0.8% 14.2% 0.7% 0.0%
Cart 8 (*11) optimized 4527 92.0% 2.3% 0.0 % 5.5% 0.0%
exhaustive 4527 92.0% 2.3% 0.0 % 5.5% 0.0%
Table 4.4: Comparison of modes optimized and exhaustive of BFS-Cheap
on open-source cloud services. Shows the number of requests sent in 1 hour
(Tests) with BFS-Cheap, the percentage of tests generated by all four checkers com-
bined (Checkers), and the number of bug buckets found by the main driver and each of
the four checkers. The second column shows the total number of requests in each API
family as well as the average number of primitive value combinations for the requests
of each API family. Overall, across all API families, in mode optimized the propor-
tion of tests generated by the checkers decreases compared to the respective exhaustive
explorations.
Comparing Checker Optimizations
Finally, We now compare the performance of the checker optimizations (two modes:
optimized and exhaustive) discussed in Chapter 4.3. We report results on proprietary
cloud services and on open-source cloud services.
Proprietary cloud services. Table 4.3 shows how many requests were sent in one
hour of fuzzing with BFS-Cheap in the Tests column, and what percentage of those
requests were generated by either the main driver of Chapter 3.3. The table also shows
how many unique bugs (bug buckets) were found in one hour of search by the main
77
driver and by each of the checkers. Results are presented for both the optimized and
the exhaustive modes previously discussed.
We observe that the number of tests varies for different services and checker modes.
However, the percentage of tests generated by the checkers is always higher with the
exhaustive mode, as expected. Since in the optimized mode the checkers produce
fewer tests per visited state, the main driver is allowed to explore more states faster.
Yet, despite the lower number of checker tests per visited state, for all three services
considered, the optimized mode finds all the unique bugs (bug buckets) found by the
exhaustive mode. Also, for the O-365 C service, the main driver finds one more bug
with the optimized mode compared to the exhaustive mode within one hour of search.
Table 4.3 reveals an interesting inversion that further demonstrates the value of the
optimized checkers mode. In Azure A, we observe that the optimized mode produces
almost twice as many tests than than the exhaustive mode (4050 versus 2174). At
first sight, this is counter-intuitive. After a deeper investigation, we discovered that
some of the tests produced by the exhaustive mode of the user-namespace checker have
significantly larger response times for service Azure A. Indeed, this specific checker in
exhaustive mode executes additional tests compared to the optimized mode, but con-
taining expensive operations (i.e., high latency) that slow down the overall throughput.
During the course of all experiments with these three services, we found and reported
a total of 7 unique bugs to the developers of those services, including 4 500 bugs found
by the main driver and 3 bugs found by each of the checkers except the user-namespace
checker. In the next section, we discuss several interesting bugs found thanks to the
checkers introduced in this paper.
Open-source cloud services. Table 4.4 shows how many requests were sent in one
hour of fuzzing with BFS-Cheap in the Tests column, and what percentage of those
requests were generated by either the main driver of Chapter 3.3 or by any of the
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four checkers. Unlike Table 4.3 of proprietary cloud service, Table 4.4 shows no bug
buckets because the checkers found no confirmed bugs within one hour in none of the
three cloud services. We make the following observations, regarding the impact of the
optimizations on the number of additional tests generated by the checkers.
First, across all APIs, the optimized version of the use-after-free, the resource leak-
age, and the user-namespace checkers consistently lead to a lower percentage of addi-
tional tests generated by the checkers compared to the exhaustive exploration. This
is the desired behaviour and is also expected. Recall from Chapter 4.3, that only the
use-after-free, the resource leakage, and the user-namespace checkers have optimized
versions, while there is no optimization performed on the resource-hierarchy checker.
Therefore, as shown in the second column from the end, the difference between the two
versions of the experiments (optimized versus exhaustive checkers) for the resource-
hierarchy checker is either insignificant or there are some inversions that highlight the
complementarity among checkers.
For example, in Commits the optimized version of the resource-hierarchy checker
leads to more tests compared to the exhaustive one (0.8% versus 0.6%). Similarly, in
Branches the optimized version of the resource-hierarchy checker again leads to more
tests compared to the exhaustive one (1.7% versus 0.5%) and in Accounts & Lists the
optimized version of the resource-hierarchy checker leads to more tests compared to
the exhaustive one (2.2% versus 0.8%). This inversion, specifically for the resource-
hierarchy checker (less tests in the exhaustive mode for some of the experiments) is a
side-effect of the complementarity among checkers: less pressure added by one checker
(i.e., less additional tests), more capacity for additional tests given to another checker
in a given time frame.
Second, focusing on Table 4.4 and specifically on the use-after-free checker (first
column of checker stats), we observe that the impact of the optimizations is more
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evident in API families with many requests, such as User Groups (from 6.1% to 1.9%)
and Projects (from 67.6% to 7.7%). This happens because in the exhaustive mode of
the use-after-free checker Figure 4.1, after deletion of a dynamic resource, each request
available in reqCollection which consumes the same dynamic resource type (as the
deleted resource), is invoked on the deleted request (line 12 to 19). Inevitably, more
requests available in reqCollecctin will lead to more additional test. By contrast,
in the optimized mode the use-after-free checker, the loop of lines 12 to 19 stops, in a
partial search, once one request which consumes a matching resource type is executed.
Third, focusing on the resource-leakage checker (second column of checker stats),
we observe the overall decrease in the number of test when using the optimized mode
(Figure 4.2). However, it is more difficult to identify a more specific pattern based on
the characteristics of each API. This is partially due to the nature of the BFS-Cheap
search strategy used: the search stops once a valid and an invalid rendering has been
found. This scheme makes the number of additional new tests generated from the
leakage checker dependent on the ordering of the value combinations rendered for each
grammar of each API. Obviously, such ordering is not consistent and comparable across
APIs. That is, if the ordering of values is such that 1000 invalid renderings precede
a valid one, then the leakage checker will be invoked 1000 additional times (see line 8
of Figure 4.5). On the other hand, if the ordering of values is such that 1 invalid
renderings follows a valid one, then the leakage checker will be invoked 1 additional
times. Therefore, fine-grained comparisons between APIs are inconsistent.
Finally, regarding the user-namespace checker (last column of checker stats), we
observe that the specific property was not applicable on Accounts & Lists, Statuses,
and Cart APIs since the checker never kicked in. Furthermore, we observe a relatively
similar decrease in the number of checker tests when using the optimized mode across
all APIs, excluding Projects. This inversion, on Projects API is, again, a side-effect of
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the complementarity between the checkers. In particular observe that in the optimized
mode, the total number of tests fall from 5072 to 1379 and that, at the same time, the
percentage drop in the use-after-free tests is from 67% to 7% while the user-namespace
tests increase from 17% to 34%. Clearly, the exhaustive mode of the use-after-free
checker was saturating the user-namespace checker (as well as the main driver) by
creating too many additional tests.
4.6 New Bugs Found
At the time of this writing, we have used stateful REST API fuzzing extended with
active checkers to test nearly a dozen production Azure and Office-365 cloud services
of size and complexity similar to the three services used in the previous section. In
almost all cases, our fuzzing was able to find about a handful of new bugs in each of
these services. About two thirds of those bugs are “500 Internal Server Errors”, and
about one third are rule violations reported by our security checkers. We have reported
all these bugs to the respective service owners and all have been fixed.
We emphasize that, even when the security checkers do not find any bugs, they
increase confidence that the rules they check cannot be violated and therefore they
increase confidence in the overall service reliability and security.
This section presents examples of real bugs found in deployed Azure and Office-
365 services and discusses their security relevance. We anonymize the name of those
services and key details to avoid targeting any specific service.
Use-after-free violation in Azure. In an Azure service, we found the following
use-after-free violation.
1. Create a new resource R (with a PUT request).
2. Delete resource R (with a DELETE request).
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3. Create a new child resource of the deleted resource R and of a specific type (with
another PUT request).
This sequence of requests results in a “500 Internal Server Error”. The Use-after-free
checker catches this as (1) it attempts to re-use in Step 3 the deleted resource in Step 2
and (2) the response of Step 3 is different from the expected “404 Not Found” response.
Resource-hierarchy violation in Office365. In an Office365 messaging service
where users can post messages and then reply and edit these, the resource-hierarchy
checker detected the following bug.
1. Create a first message msg-1 (with a request POST /api/posts/msg-1).
2. Create a second message msg-2 (with a request POST /api/posts/msg-2).
3. Create a reply reply-1 to the first message (with a request POST /api/posts/msg-
1/replies/reply-1).
4. Edit the reply reply-1 with a PUT request using msg-2 as message identifier
(with a request PUT /api/posts/msg-2/replies/reply-1).
Surprisingly, the last request in Step 4 returns a “200 Allowed” response while it must
have returned a “404 Not Found” response. This rule violation reveals that the im-
plementation of the API that posts a reply does not analyze the full hierarchy when
checking permissions for a reply. Missing hierarchy validation checks are potential se-
curity vulnerabilities: an attacker might be able to exploit them to access child objects
by bypassing the parent hierarchy.
Resource-leak violation in Azure. In another Azure service, the resource-leak
checker triggered the following bug.
1. Create a new resource of type CM and of name X with a specific malformed
body (with a PUT request). This returns a “500 Internal Server Error”, which is
already a bug.
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2. Get a list of all resources of type CM: the returned list is empty.
3. Create a new resource of type CM with the same name X as in Step 1 with a
well-formed body but in a different region (e.g., US-West versus US-Central) with
a PUT request.
Unexpectedly, the last request in Step 3 returns a response “409 Conflict” instead
of an expected “200 Created”. This behavior means that the service has reached an
inconsistent state: the failed request in Step 1 has left unintended side-effects on the
service state. Indeed, the GET request in Step 2 shows that the user view is correct: the
CM resource named X attempted to be created in Step 1 has not been created. However,
the second PUT request in Step 3 proves that the service still remembers the failed
creation of the CM resource named X attempted in the first PUT request of Step 1. This
bug is potentially dangerous: an attacker could create an unbounded number of such
“zombie” resources by repeating Step 1 using many different names, and exceed his/her
official quota since such failed resource creations are (correctly) not counted towards
the user’ resource quota. Yet, they are clearly remembered (incorrectly) somewhere in
the backend service.
Anecdotal Experiences: Eager Resource-Accounting DoS Attack. During the
course of our experiments, we found another type of cloud-service security vulnerability
by accident. Specifically, we planned to fuzz an Azure service overnight. However,
after fuzzing that service for about five hours, we were contacted by the Azure team
owning that service: they had detected unusual traffic created by our fuzzing tests and
asked us to stop those tests immediately. Indeed, they told us our experiments had
unintentionally caused serious health issues to this service. We summarize the security
and reliability vulnerability that was determined to be the root cause of the incident
which we accidentally triggered.
Our fuzzing system uses a garbage collector to avoid exceeding quotas for the cloud
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resources created during fuzzing. For instance, if the default quota for a resource type
Y is 100, at most 100 resources of that type can be created at any time, and our garbage
collector makes sure that the number of live resources never exceeds such quotas by
deleting (using a DELETE request) resources that are no longer used. Without garbage
collection, our fuzzing tool would typically reach quota limits in minutes and would not
be able to continue its state-space exploration.
In the case of the specific Azure service, it turns out that any PUT request to
create a resource of a specific type, let us call it IM, returns a response quickly (nearly
instantaneously) but actually also triggers other tasks that take minutes to complete in
the service backend. Similarly, a DELETE request for a resource of that same type IM
also returns quickly but also trigger delete tasks that also take minutes to complete.
The health issue we triggered was due to the way internal service counters, track-
ing resource usage, were updated when creating and deleting resources of type IM.
Specifically, PUT and DELETE requests that create and delete resources of type IM
updated counters towards quotas eagerly (i.e., without waiting for the several minutes
actually needed to fully complete these actions). As a result, an attacker could create-
then-delete quickly many resources of type IM without exceeding his/her quota while
triggering a huge number of backend tasks—orders-of-magnitude more than the official
quota—hence, literally flooding the backend service with an enormous number of tasks.
Such a Denial-of-Service attack was accidentally triggered by our fuzzing tool and its
garbage collector and is relevant to the intuition behind the Use-after-free checker:
that is, once a resource is deleted no side-effect should impact the state of the backend
service. However, since such delete operations must usually be asynchronous, similar
errors, that can even lead to security vulnerabilities, are difficult to foresee.
A fix to this vulnerability is to update usage counters towards quotas for DELETE
requests only when all delete backend operations have been completed i.e., minutes later
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in the case of IM resources. This way, the amount of backend tasks is still linearly
bounded by the official quota, since subsequent IM resource-creation PUT requests will
be blocked until preceding DELETE requests have been fully completed.
4.7 Summary
We introduced four security rules that capture desirable properties of REST APIs and
services, and showed how stateful REST API fuzzing can be extended with active prop-
erty checkers that automatically test and detect violations of these rules. We imple-
mented active checkers following a modular design and evaluated various performance
optimization on three open-source and three proprietary cloud services. Using active
property checkers we reported bugs related to rules violations of security properties on
proprietary Azure and Office365 services, which were all fixed. Indeed, violations of
the four security rules, introduced earlier, are clearly potential security vulnerabilities.





Stateful REST API Fuzzing
In the previous chapters, we described systems that automate stateful REST API
fuzzing and extended it with checkers that detect violations of desirable security prop-
erties. These systems, in principal, implement grammar-based fuzzing and inherit some
of its limitations. In particular, the automatically generated fuzzing grammar rules usu-
ally include few values for each primitive type, like strings and numeric values, in order
to limit the combinatorial explosion of the fuzzing space. These primitive-type values
are either obtained from the API specification itself or from a user-defined dictionary
of values. Furthermore, all these values remain static over time, and are not prioritized
in any way. These limitations (fuzzing rules with predefined sets of values and lack of
feedback) are typical of grammar-based fuzzing beyond REST API fuzzing.
In this chapter, we introduce Pythia1, a new fuzzer that augments grammar-based
fuzzing with coverage-guided feedback and a learning-based mutation strategy for stateful
REST API fuzzing. Pythia’s mutation strategy helps generate grammatically-valid test
1 Pythia was an ancient Greek priestess who served as oracle, commonly known as the Oracle of
Delphi, and was credited for various prophecies.
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6 HTTP/1.1 201 Created
7 {”id”:1243, ”name”:”21a8fa”, created_at”:”2019−11−23T20:57:15”,
8 ”creator_id”:1, ”forks_count”:0, ”owner”:{”state”:”active”}}
9





15 HTTP/1.1 201 Created
16 {”branch”:”feature1”, ”commit”:{”id”:”33c42b”, ”parent_ids”:[],
17 ”title”:”Add README.md”, ”message”:”Add README.md”,
18 ”author_name”:”admin”, ”authored_date”:”2019−11−23T20:57:18”}
19






26 HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
27 {”message”:”internal server error”} 
Figure 5.1: Pythia test case and bug found. The test case is a sequence of three
API requests testing commit operations on GitLab. After creating a new project (first
request) and a new branch (second request), a commit with an invalid file path triggers
an unhandled exception.
cases and coverage-guided feedback helps prioritize the test cases that are more likely
to find bugs.
5.1 Background and Motivation
To motivate the benefit of Pythia over the purely grammar-based systems discussed
earlier, we present a sample REST API test case which, in fact, uncovers a previously-
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unknown bug in GitLab and explain why such test cases are beyond reach for the tools
discussed earlier
Example REST API test case and detected bug. Figure 5.1 shows a sample
Pythia test case for GitLab. The test case consists of three request-response pairs and
exercises functionality related to version control commit operations. The first request of
type POST (line 1) creates a new GitLab project. It has a path without any resources
and a body dictionary with a parameter specifying the desired name of the requested
project (“21a8fa”). In response, it receives back metadata describing the newly created
project, including its unique id (line 6). The second request, also of type POST, creates
a repository branch in an existing project (line 10). It has a path using the previously
created resource of type “project” and id “1243”, and a body dictionary setting the
target branch name (“feature1”), such that, the branch can be created within the
previously created project. In response (line 15), it receives back metadata describing
the newly created branch, including its designated name. Finally, the last request
(line 20) uses the latest branch (in its body) and the unique project id (in its path) and
creates a new commit. The body of this request contains a set of parameters specifying
the name of the existing target branch, the desired commit message (“testString”), and
the actions related to the new commit (i.e., creation of a file). However, the relative
path of the target file contains an unexpected value “admin\xd7@example.com”, which
triggers a 500 Internal Server Error (line 26) because the unicode ‘x7’ is unhandled in
the ruby library trying to detokenize and parse the relative file path. We treat “500
Internal Server Errors” as bugs. To generate similar test cases, with unexpected values,
one has to decide which requests of a test case to mutate, what parts of each individual
request to mutate, and what new values to inject in the mutated parts.
Complexity of REST API testing. The example of Figure 5.1 shows the sequence of
events that need to take place before uncovering an error. It highlights the complexity
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of REST API testing due to the structured format of each API request and because
of producer-consumer dependencies between API requests. For example, the second
request of Figure 5.1 (line x) must include a properly structured body payload and also
use the project id “1243” created by the first request. Similarly, the third request (line x)
must include a properly structured body payload and use resources produced by the
two preceding requests (one in its path and one in its body). Overall, a REST API test
case is syntactically valid regarding the syntax of internal parts of individual requests
(i.e., request type, path, header, and body) and semantically valid regarding producer-
consumer dependencies across requests. A syntactically and semantically valid test case
is a grammatically valid, or just valid, test case. Furthermore, each valid test case is
a stateful sequence of requests, since resources produced by preceding requests may be
used by subsequent requests.
Limitations of stateful REST API fuzzing. Stateful REST API fuzzing, intro-
duced in Chapter 3, is a grammar-based fuzzing approach that statically analyzes the
documentation of a REST API and generates a fuzzing grammar for testing a target
service through its REST API. A RESTler fuzzing grammar contains rules describ-
ing (i) how to fuzz each individual API request; (ii) what the dependencies are across
API requests and how can they be combined in order to produce longer and longer
test cases; and (iii) how to parse each response and retrieve ids of resources created
by preceding requests in order to make them available to subsequent requests. Dur-
ing fuzzing, each request is executed with various value combinations depending on
its primitive types, and the values available for each primitive type are specified in a
user-provided fuzzing dictionary. In the example of Figure 5.1, the value of the field
“action” in the last request (line 24) will be one of “create”, “delete”, “move”, “up-
date”, and “chmod” (i.e., the available mutations for this enum type) and the value of
the field “commit_message” will be one of “testString” or “nil” (the default available
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mutations for string types). In contrast, the value of the field “branch,” which is a
producer-consumer dependency, will always have the value “feature1” created by the
previous request. By construction, the set of grammar rules driving stateful REST API
fuzzing leads to grammatically valid test cases.
However, stateful REST API fuzzing, and more broadly grammar-based fuzzing,
has two limitations. First, the available mutation values per primitive type are limited
to a small, fixed number in order to bound an inevitable combinatorial explosion in
the number of possible fuzzing rules and values. Second, these static values remain
constant over time and are not prioritized in any way.
In the next section, we introduce Pythia, a new fuzzer that augments grammar-
based fuzzing with coverage-guided feedback and a learning-based mutation strat-
egy for stateful REST API fuzzing. Pythia’s mutation fuzzing strategy generates
grammatically-valid new test cases and coverage-guided feedback is used to prioritize
test cases that are more likely to find new bugs.
5.2 Overview of Pythia
Pythia is a grammar-based fuzzing engine to test cloud services through their REST
APIs. Since these APIs are structured (see Chapter 5.1), generating meaningful test
cases (a.k.a. mutants) is a non-trivial task—the mutants should be grammatically valid
to bypass initial syntactic and semantic checks; yet, they must contain some ill-formed
inputs to uncover errors. Randomly mutating seed inputs often results in invalid test
cases, as we will see in Chapter 5.6. One potential solution is to sample the mutants
from the large state space defined by the fuzzing grammar and inject errors to them.
However, for complex grammars, like those defined for REST APIs, exhaustively enu-
merating all valid mutants is infeasible. As a workaround, Pythia first uses a statistical




















New Test Cases 
adding to test case pool
Unique Code Paths
Parsing Phase Learning-based Mutations Phase Execution Phase
Figure 5.2: Pythia architecture. The steps inside the dotted box show optional,
add-on features.
Then, it generates new mutants by injecting a small amount of noise causing the learnt
model to deviate from the common usage patterns. This small noise results in mutants
that deviate from common usage pattens, yet are mostly grammatically valid.
Figure 5.2 presents a high-level overview of Pythia. It iteratively operates in three
phases: parsing, learning-based mutations, and execution. Initially, the parsing phase
(Chapter 5.3), parses the input test cases using a regular grammar and outputs the
corresponding Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs). Initial input test cases can be generated
either by using RESTler to fuzz the target service or by using actual production traffic of
the target service. Next, the learning-based mutations phase (Chapter 5.4), operates on
ASTs. The training engine trains a sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) autoencoder [67;170]
in order to learn common AST structures of seed test cases. This includes the syntax
of individual requests (i.e., primitive types and values) and the dependencies across
requests of a given test case. Then, the mutation engine generates new test cases by
injecting a small amount of random noise in the trained autoencoder causing it to
slightly deviate from common patterns and generate new test cases.
Finally, in the execution phase (Chapter 5.5), new test cases are executed by the
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S = sequence
Σ = Σhttp−methods ∪ Σresource−ids ∪ Σenum
∪ Σbool ∪ Σstring ∪ Σint ∪ Σstatic
N = {request, method, path, header, body, β1, β2, β3,
producer, consumer, fuzzable, enum,
bool, string, int, static}
R = {sequence→ request+ sequence | ε,
request→ method+ path+ header + body,
method→ Σhttp−methods , path→ β1 + path | ε,
header → β1 + header | ε, body → β1 + body | ε,
β1 → β2 | β3, β2 → producer | consumer,
producer → Σresource−ids, consumer → Σresource−ids,
β3 → static | fuzzable, static→ Σstatic,
fuzzable→ string | int | bool | enum | uuid,
string → Σstring, . . . }
Figure 5.3: Regular Grammar G for REST API test case generation. The
production rules of G with non-terminal symbols capture the properties of any REST
API specification, while the alphabet of terminal symbols is API-specific since different
APIs may contain different values for strings, integers, enums, and so on.
target service. Pythia uses a simple oracle (tracking “500 Internal Server Errors”)
to identify which test cases trigger bugs and retain them to facilitate further manual
inspection. Moreover, code coverage feedback (when available) obtained by the coverage
monitor is used to distinguish test cases that activate unique code paths and prioritize
them for further mutations and to augment the initial corpus of seed test cases. Yet,
when coverage feedback is not available, Pythia operates as a blackbox fuzzer and all
test cases are treated equally.
5.3 Parsing REST API Test Cases
In this phase, Pythia infers the syntax of the seed inputs by parsing them with a
user-provided Regular Grammar (RG) with tail recursion. Such an RG is defined by
a 4-tuple G = (N,Σ, R, S), where N is a set of non-terminal symbols, Σ is a set of
terminal symbols, R is a finite set of production rules of the form α → β1β2 . . . βn,
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Figure 5.4: Parsing RESTler seed test case into an AST. Show how Pythia parses
an RESTler seed test case (left) into an AST (right) following rules from grammar G.
where α ∈ N,n ≥ 1, βi ∈ (N ∪ Σ),∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, and S ∈ N is a distinguished start
symbol. The syntactic definition of G looks like a Context Free Grammar, but because
recursion is only allowed on the right-most non-terminal and no other cycles are allowed,
the grammar is actually regular. Figure 5.3 shows a template G for REST API test
case generation. A test case that belongs to the language defined by G is a sequence
starting with the symbol sequence followed by a successions of production rules (R)
with non-terminal symbols (N) and terminal symbols (Σ).
Theorem 1. The language described by grammar G (Figure 5.3) is regular.
Proof. We will prove Theorem 1 by writing a regular expression. We see that G is
equivalent to the regular expression (⟨A⟩ ⟨B⟩ ⟨B⟩ ⟨B⟩∗)+, where
• ⟨A⟩ = (POST | PUT | GET | DELETE | PATCH)
• ⟨B⟩ = (Σstatic | Σstring | Σint | Σbool | Σenum | Σuuid | Σresource−ids)
⟨A⟩ corresponds to all available HTTP request type values; the first ⟨B⟩ corresponds
to all primitive type values available request headers of the target API; the second ⟨B⟩












Mutated test case A1
(rules from current seed)
All leaf rules in grammar 
...
Rules in current seed Rules in other seeds
Mutated test case A2
(rules from other seeds)
... ... ... ...... ...
Figure 5.5: Seed test case and new test cases with mutations using values
from other seeds (center) or from the original seed (right). Shows the two
cases of learning-based mutations performed by Pythia.
the last (optional) ⟨B⟩ corresponds to all primitive type values available request bodies
of the target API. Therefore, the language described by G is indeed regular.
Figure 5.4 shows how seed RESTler test cases are parsed by Pythia’s parsing engine.
A successions of production rules in G are applied to infer the corresponding ASTs; the
tree internal nodes are non-terminals and the leaves are terminals of G. Pythia then
traverses the tree in Depth First Search (DFS) order and obtains a sequence of grammar
rules. For example, a simple test case X=``GET /projects/1243/repo/branches" will
be represented as a sequence of grammar production rules X =< R1, R2, . . . , R12 >
shown at the bottom of the Figure. Given a set of seed inputs, the output of this phase
is a set of abstracted test cases, D = {X1,X2, . . . ,XN}, which correspond to ASTs of
the respective seed inputs. Ultimately, the set of abstracted seed test cases, D, is passed
to the training and mutation engines.
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Figure 5.6: Overview of Pythia mutation engine. Shows an overview of Pythia’s
mutation engine
5.4 Learning-based REST API Mutations
The goal of this phase is first to use the abstracted seed test cases X ∈ D and learn com-
mon AST structures of the target APIs, and then to mutate these common structures
and generate new test cases. An autoencoder type of neural network is particularly
suitable for this purpose, as it can learn embedded representations of the input AST
structures. Then, we can add random noise to the learnt representations, decode them
back to the original AST formats, and get new test cases.
Pythia uses an autoencoder model M, which is trained on D. The autoencoder
model M consists of an encoder and a decoder (see Figure 5.6). Mencoder represents
each abstracted test case X to an embedded representation Z which captures the latent
dependencies of X . Mdecoder decodes Z back to X ′. To generate learning-based mu-
tations, Pythia minimally perturbs the embedded representation Z of X and decodes
it back to X ′. Our key insight is that, since the autoencoder is initially trained on
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Algorithm 1: Learning-based Pythia mutations
Input: seeds D, grammar G, model Mθ,D, batch N
1 while time_budget do
2 X ← get_next_seed(D)
3 Z ←Mθ,D.encoder(X )
4 new_sequences← ∅
// Perturbation: Exponential search on random noise scale
5 for j ← 0 to N do
// Noise draw from normal distribution
6 δj ← random.normal(Z.shape, 0)
// Bound and scale random noise
7 δj ← 2j ∗ δj/∥Z∥2
// Add noise on decoder's starting state
8 X ′j ←Mθ,D.decoder(Z + δj)
9 new_sequences.append(X ′j)
10 end
// Select the prediction with smallest noise scale
11 X ′min ← argminscale new_sequences
// Case 1: Grammar rules from current seed
12 rules← terminals(X )
13 foreach index in get_different_leaves(X , X ′min) do
14 foreach rule in rules do
15 mutation← rule+ random_bytes




// Case 2: Grammar rules from other seeds
20 rules← terminals(G)− terminals(X )
21 foreach index in get_common_leaves(X , X ′min) do
22 foreach rule in rules do
23 mutation← rule+ random_bytes





grammatically valid test cases, most of the generated ASTs will remain grammatically
valid even after adding small perturbations on Z. Furthermore, the generated output
ASTs will have fewer discrepancies (i.e., differ less) from the respective input ASTs
at places where the structure is common across many training inputs and, conversely,
more discrepancies (i.e., differ more) from the respective input ASTs at places where
the structure is less common across training inputs. Next, we explain how we leverage
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this insight to generate API-specific learning-based mutations that lead to new gram-
matically valid new test cases, with sufficiently ill-formed parts which exercise rare code
paths and uncover bugs.
Training engine.
Given the abstracted test cases in D, the training engine learns their encoded vector
representations using an autoencoder type of neural network [108], which is realized with
a simple seq2seq model MD trained over D. Usually, a seq2seq model is trained to
map variable-length sequences of one domain to another (e.g., English to French). By
contrast, we trainM only on sequences of domain D such thatMD captures the latent
characteristics of test cases.
A typical seq2seq model consists of two Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs): an
encoder RNN and a decoder RNN. The encoder RNN consists of a hidden state h and an
optional output y, and operates on a variable length input sequence x =< x1, . . . , xn >,
augmented with two auxiliary tokens <SOS> and <EOS> marking the beginning and the
ending of each sequence respectively. At each time t (which can be thought of as position
in the sequence), the encoder reads sequentially each symbol xt of input x, updates its
hidden state ht by ht = f(ht−1, xt), where f is a non-linear activation function, such as
a simple REctified Linear Unit (ReLU) or a more complex a Long Short-Term Memory
LSTM) unit [109], and calculates the output yt by yt = ϕ(ht), where ϕ is an activation
function producing valid probabilities [57]. At the end of each input sequence, the hidden
state of the encoder is a summary z of the whole sequence. Conversely, the decoder
RNN generates an output sequence y =< y1, . . . , yn′ > by predicting the next symbol
yt given the hidden state ht, where both yt and ht are conditioned on yt−1 and on the
summary z of the input sequence. Hence, the hidden state of the decoder at time t is
computed by ht = f(ht−1, yt−1, z), and the conditional distribution of the next symbol
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is computed by yt = ϕ(ht, yt−1, z), given functions f and ϕ.





i=1 logpθ(yi|xi), where θ is the set of the learnt model parameters and
each xi,yi ∈ D. As explained earlier,Mθ,D is trained on sequences of one domain (i.e.,
y = x) and is then used by the mutation engine.
Mutation engine.
For each test case X ∈ D, the goal of the mutation engine is to decide how to mutate
each input location of X . Since X is a sequence of grammar rules < R1, R2, . . . , Rn >
(see Chapter 5.4), the mutation strategy determines how to mutate each rule. Our
learning-based mutation engine sees a rule Ri (in its context) in one of the following
ways: either it has or has not seen Ri’s alternatives in the training corpus. In the first
case, Pythia mutates Ri with alternative rules from the context of the current seed
(Chapter 5.5; center); otherwise, Pythia mutates Ri with randomly selected new rules
from other seeds in the training corpus (Chapter 5.5; right). Both cases lead to mutants
that are grammatically valid as Pythia operates on the leaf nodes of AST structures.
This mutation strategy is realized by the auto-encoder. To mutate a seed test
X , Pythia perturbs its embedded vector representation (Z) by iteratively adding ran-
dom noise of increasing scale, and then decodes it back to a new test case X ′ =<
R′1, R
′
2, . . . , R
′
n >. The minimum perturbation that creates differences between X and
X ′ is selected, and the respective differences determine how to mutate each rule of the
seed test case X as follows:
1. Rules where R′i and Ri differ indicate locations where the model has seen more
variance during training and mutations with the rules from the context of the
current seed should be used (Figure 5.5; center).
2. Rules where R′i and Ri are the same after the perturbation indicate locations
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where the model has not seen many variations in those rules and their context
during training, and thus, mutations with new rules, not in the original in in-
put/output sequences, should be used (Figure 5.5; right).
Algorithm 1 implements Pythia’s learning-based mutation strategy and Chapter 5.6
pictorially illustrates it. The algorithm takes a set of abstracted test cases D, a regular
grammar G, a trained autoencoder model Mθ,D and its batch size N as inputs, and
iterates over D until the time budget expires (Line 1). At a high level, the algorithm
operates in 2 steps: perturbations and comparison-mutations.
• Perturbations (lines 5 to 11): For each test case X , the encoder of model Mθ,D
obtains its embedding Z and Pythia perturbs it with random noise. Pythia draws N
noise-values {δ0, δ1, . . . , δN−1} from a normal distribution, bounded by 2−norm of Z
and scaled exponentially in the range {20, 21, . . . , 2N−1}. The N noise values are used
to perturb Z independently N times and get different perturbed vectors {Z + δ0, Z +
δ1, . . . , Z + δN−1}, which serve as N different starting states of the decoder. In turn,
they lead to N different outputs {X ′0, X ′i , . . . , X ′N−1} for each input X . From these
N outputs, Pythia selects X ′min which differs from X and is obtained by the smallest
(2-norm) perturbation δmin on Z.
The N -step exponential search for the smallest perturbation that leads to a new
output X ′min helps avoid pervasive changes that completely destroy the embedded rep-
resentation Z of X . In fact, perturbing the embedded representation Z of X with noise
and decoding it back to X ′min forces the model to act as a denoising autoencoder [176].
Such models are robust to partial noise destructions, since the learnt representation
is expected to capture stable structures of common dependencies in the observed in-
puts [175]. Hence, the outputs X ′min will be close to the respective inputs X , and many
will remain grammatically valid because the model is trained on grammatically valid in-
puts. Furthermore, because of the variance-bias trade-off [89], the recovered output ASTs
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will have less discrepancies (lower error) from the respective input ASTs at places where
the structure is common across many training inputs (low variance); and conversely,
the recovered output ASTs will have more discrepancies (higher error) at places where
the structure is less common across training inputs (high variance). We leverage these
insights and generate learning-based mutations by comparing X with X ′min for each test
case X ∈ D.
• Comparison & Mutations (lines 12 to 27): The two groups of nested for-loops in
Algorithm 1 implement the two different mutation cases explained earlier. The first
group of nested for-loops (lines 13 to 19) targets leaf locations where X and X ′min
differ (high variance, case 1). In such locations of X , new mutations are generated
by iteratively applying leaf grammar rules (i.e., terminal symbols) in X . The second
group of nested for-loops (lines 21 to 27) targets leaf locations where X ′min and X are
the same (low variance, case 2). In such locations of X , new mutations are generated
by iteratively applying leaf grammar rules originally not in X . In both cases, the new
grammar rules are augmented with auxiliary random byte alternations on the byte
representation of rule terminals to avoid repeatedly exercising identical rule payloads.
5.5 Execution Phase
In this phase, the execution engine takes as input new test cases generated by the
mutation engine and executes them to the target service. Executing a test case includes
sending its requests to the target service over http(s) and receiving the respective
responses back. During such interactions, Pythia uses a simple oracle. to identify
which test cases lead to responses indicating bugs to retain them for further manual
inspection. Currently, Pythia uses a simple oracle that captures 500s, which are a
generic class of errors indicating internal server errors. Yet, in principle, Pythia could
replace its oracle with recent tools that capture other types of failures [46].
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During testing, Pythia leverages code coverage information, obtained by the cover-
age monitor, to distinguish test cases that activate unique code paths. To track covered
code, Pythia first statically analyzes the target service and extracts basic block loca-
tions. Then, the target service is configured to produce code coverage information,
which is collected by the coverage monitor. Given the basic block locations extracted
and the coverage information collected by the coverage monitor during testing, each
test case is mapped to a bitmap describing the respective code path activated. Such
code coverage information (feedback) helps distinguishing test cases that reach new
code paths and ultimately minimize an initially large corpus of many likely-redundant
test cases to a smaller set that entirely consists of test cases activating unique code
paths. Yet, if it is infeasible to collect code coverage information for a target service,
Pythia operates as a purely blackbox fuzzer and still outperforms prior approaches both
in code coverage achieved and in bugs found (see Chapter 5.6).
Implementation of Pythia
Pythia follows a single-threaded Python implementation. Although a multi-threaded
implementation may increase testing throughput, Pythia targets server-side code and
in a multi-threaded environment it would be challenging to disentangle requests from
concurrent sequences and reconstruct the exact test cases triggering a bug. We use an
off-the-shelf seq2seq RNN with input embedding, implemented in tensorflow [172]. The
model has one layer of 256 Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [69] cells in both encoder and
decoder. Dynamic input unrolling is performed using tf.nn.dynamic RNN APIs and
the encoder is initialized with a zero state. We train the model by minimizing the
weighted cross-entropy loss for sequences of logits using the Adam optimizer [117]. We
use batches of 32 sequences, iterate for 2k training steps with a learning rate of 0.001,
and initial embedding layer of size 100. The vocabulary of the model depends on the
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number of production rules in the fuzzing grammar of each API family and ranges in
couple of hundred “words”. Training such a seq2seq model in a CPU-only machine takes
no more than two hours. All the experiments discussed in our evaluations were run on
Ubuntu 18.04 Google Cloud VMs [22] with 8 logical CPU cores and 52GB of physical
memory. Each fuzzing client is used to test a target service deployment running on the
same machine with the fuzzing client.
5.6 Evaluation
In this section, we report results of experiments obtained with Pythia on there open-
source cloud services. We answer the following questions:
Q1: How do the three baselines compare with Pythia in terms of code coverage increase
over time?
Q2: How does initial seed selection impact the code coverage achieved by Pythia?
Q3: How does code coverage feedback impact the code coverage achieved by Pythia?
Q4: Can Pythia detect new bugs in production-scale cloyud services?
Experimental setup.
In total, we tested six API families of GitLab [93], two of Mastodon [131], and one of
Spree [168]. These API families and services are the same with the ones used the previous
chapters (see Table 3.1). We also use here the same configurations as the ones described
in Chapter 4.5. In principal, the total number of requests in each API family along with
the average number of available primitive value combinations for each request indicate
the size of the state space that needs to be tested.
Monitoring framework & initial seeds. We statically analyze the source code of
each target service to extract basic block locations and configure each service, using
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of Pythia mutations strategies with respect to other
baselines. Seed collection phase: Run RESTler on each API family to generate seed
corpora. Fuzzing phase: Use the seed corpora generated in the seed collection phase
to perform three individual 24h fuzzing sessions per API family. Comparison: Shows
the number of new lines executed during the fuzzing phase, excluding those executed
during the seed collection phase. Pythia performs best compared to all baselines.
Ruby’s Class:TracePoint hooks, to produce stack traces of lines of codes executed
during testing. During testing, all target services are being monitored by Pythia’s
coverage monitor which converts stack traces to bitmaps of basic block activations
corresponding to the test cases executed. In total, our static analysis extracts 11, 413
basic blocks for GitLab, 2, 501 basic blocks for Mastodon, and 2, 616 Spree.
Unless otherwise specified, we obtain initial seed corpora by running RESTler for
24h on each API family using its default Breadth First Search (BFS) fuzzing mode, its
default fuzzing dictionary (i.e., two values for each primitive type), and by turning off its
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Garbage Collector (GC) to obtain deterministic results. We choose BFS mode because
in this mode RESTler conducts a systematic state space exploration and generates
balanced test case sequences, with enough variation and reasonable lengths to train
seq2seq RNNs. Depending on the target API, a test-case length ranges from 3 to 6
requests, or equivalently from 505 to 825 production rules, or from 907 to 1430 raw
bytes. In contrast, RESTler’s BFS-Fast and RandomWalk fuzzing modes lead to test
cases that are unusable to train seq2seq RNNs. (BFS-Fast leads to few, very long test
cases and RandomWalk leads to entirely random test cases.) Yet, when we compare
the number of bugs found by Pythia versus RESTler, we run RESTler in all its fuzzing
modes and report its best numbers.
Baselines. We evaluate Pythia against three blackbox baselines.
(i) RESTler: We use RESTler both for seed test case generation and for comparison.
On each family of target APIs, we run RESTler for 2 days. The first day, seed collection
phase, is used to generate seed test cases. The second day, fuzzing phase, is used for
comparison. We compare the incremental coverage achieved by RESTler versus Pythia
over the initial coverage achieved in the seed collection phase.
(ii) Random byte-level mutations: This is the simplest form of mutations. As suggested
by their name, byte-level mutations are random alternations on the bytes of each seed
test case. In order to produce byte-level mutations, the mutation engine selects a
random target position within the seed sequence and a random byte value (in the
range 0 − 255), and updates the target position to the random byte value. Naturally,
this type of mutations is not designed to generate grammatically valid mutants.
(iii) Random tree-level mutations: In order to produce random tree-level mutations,
the mutation engine selects a random leaf of the respective AST representation and a
random rule from G with a terminal symbol, and flips the target leaf with using the
random rule. The mutations are exclusively performed on the tree leaves, and not in
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Figure 5.8: Impact of initial seed collection. Seed collection: Run RESTler for
12h on each API. Fuzzing: Use each corpus to perform three individual 24h guided
tree-level Pythia mutation sessions. Moreover, let RESTler run for 24h additional hours
(32h in total). Comparison: Shows the number of new lines executed after the initial
12h of seed collection.
internal nodes, in order to largely maintain the grammatical validity of each test case.
Leaves correspond to primitive values and substituting a primitive value with a value of
another type will most likely maintain grammatical validity. However, since the target
leaves and the new rules (mutations) are selected at random for each test case, the
target state space for mutations on realistic tests cases is quite large. For example, the
test case shown in Figure 5.1 corresponds to a tree consisting of 73 leaf nodes and the
grammar used to produce it has 66 rules with terminal rules. This, defines a state space
with approximately 5, 000 feasible mutations only for one seed — let alone the total size
of the state space defined by the complete corpus of seeds. Next, we evaluate Pythia’s
learning-based mutation strategy which considers the intrinsic structure of each test
case and significantly prunes the size of the search space.
Code Coverage Achieved by Pythia (Q1)
We investigate Pythia’s code coverage compared to the three blackbox baselines in-
troduced above. Since all baselines are blackbox, here, we run Pythia without using
code coverage feedback. RESTler is initially run for 24 hours to generate seed corpora
(seed collection phase) across each API family. The seed collection phase is extended
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to 32 hours only in “Issues & Notes” API family due to a late plateau, explained in Q3.
Then, RESTler runs for 24 additional hours for comparison (fuzzing phase), and all
other fuzzers, including Pythia, are only run for the 24h fuzzing phase, as they mutate
seed corpora generated by RESTler. Figure 5.7 shows the results.
In comparison to RESTler, during the 24h fuzzing phase Pythia discovers new lines
of code (LOC) across all APIs and services, ranging from 43 lines (for “Accounts &
Lists”) to 500 lines (for “Cart & Products”). In contrast, RESTler plateaus after the
initial seed collection phase and discovers no new lines during the 24h fuzzing phase.
The only exception is “Cart & Products” where RESTler discovers 30 lines after 16
hours, while Pythia discovers 500 new lines.
Pythia discovers more LOC than RESTler in the fuzzing phase, because the latter
navigates extremely large search spaces. For example, during fuzzing “Commits” API,
RESTler explores a search space of 19K sequences of length five and 11 possible value
combinations each (on average). Such search-space explosion is similar across all APIs
and once RESTler plateaus, it is then challenging to further increase code coverage.
In contrast, Pythia performs learning-based mutations and, as shown in Figure 5.7,
in the fuzzing phase it outperforms RESTler and always finds new LOC across all
APIs. The percentage improvement of Pythia over the initial code coverage achieved
by RESTler in the seed collection phase ranges between 1% and 15% (depending on
the target APIs). This increase, although relatively small is the result of learning-
based mutations performed only by Pythia that allows exercising rare code paths, never
reached by RESTler, and uncovers bugs.
We also compare Pythia with two random baselines. Across all APIs the relative
ordering of all fuzzers remains consistent: Pythia outperforms the random tree-level
baseline, which, in turn, outperforms the random byte-level baseline. Such ordering is
expected. As explained earlier, raw byte-level mutations tend to violate both semantic
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and syntactic validity of the seed test cases and consequently underperform compared
to tree-level mutations that mostly obey grammatical validity. Although the latter
produces syntactically valid mutations, it mutates without API-specific guidance and,
thus, cannot target its mutations to locations that have a higher impact on code cover-
age. In contrast, Pythia produces API-specific learning-based mutations that increase
code coverage faster and higher than random tree-level mutations.
Impact of Seed Selection (Q2)
Previously, we saw that RESTler plateaus in the initial seed collection phase and then
discovers almost no newlines while fuzzing across all API families. In contrast, Pythia
uses RESTler seeds and further increases code coverage in the fuzzing phase. We
will now investigate how RESTler and Pythia compare before RESTler plateaus and
examine the impact of initial seed selection on the line coverage achieved by Pythia. We
consider that RESTler plateaus if it discovers no new lines during the 24h fuzzing phase.
We select “Issues & Notes” because RESTler takes the longest time to plateau among
all API families (discovers new lines up until 32h) and compare three RESTler seed
collection configurations: RESTler run for 12h (generates 5K seeds), for 24h (generates
12K seeds), and for 32h (generates 15K seeds). Figure 5.8 shows the cumulative increase
in the number of lines executed by RESTler and Pythia during the fuzzing phase (on top
of those executed during the seed collection phase) as well as the union and intersection
of lines executed by both tools.
In the 12h setting, the lines discovered by Pythia are a superset of those discovered
by RESTler because the intersection overlaps with RESTler while the union overlaps
with Pythia. By contrast, in the 24h setting, the two tools discover diverging sets of lines
because the intersection remains constant while both tools discover new lines and the




New LOC executed by Pythia
Blackbox Greybox Improvement
Commits 457 457 -
Branches 336 340 1%
Issues & Notes 312 384 23%
Groups & Mmbrs 185 220 19%
Projects 209 292 40%
Repos & Files 213 240 13%
Accounts & Lists 38 38 -
Statuses 79 79 -
Storefront Cart 526 614 17%
Table 5.1: Impact of code coverage feedback. Shows the total number of lines
executed by Pythia after 24h of fuzzing each API family without and with using code
coverage feedback.
those discovered by RESTler. As explained in Chapter 5.4, Pythia generates mutations
using many new values for each primitive type (including random payload alternations),
whereas RESTler uses a predefined set of values and conducts a systematic state space
exploration. Because RESTler search spaces are typically large, given few seeds (e.g.,
5K in the 12h settings), Pythia may outperform RESTler and explore new lines faster.
However, Pythia is not designed to perform mutations that extend sequences with
additional requests and instead focuses on targeted AST-leaf-level mutations. Thus, if
the initial seed corpus is large and RESTler has not plateaued (e.g., 12K seeds in the
24h setting), Pythia and RESTler may discover diverging sets of new lines.
Overall, when Pythia is run after RESTler plateaus (few hours in most API families
except “Issues & Notes”), the lines discovered by Pythia are a superset of those discov-
ered by RESTler because the former performs new mutations that exercise new LOC
and discover new bugs. Yet, even when RESTler has not plateaued (e.g., in the 12h
setting RESTler keeps discovering new lines in the fuzzing phase), Pythia still discovers
new LOC, on top of those discovered by RESTler. The conclusions drawn for “Issues
& Notes” generalize across all API families tested so far.
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Impact of Code Coverage Feedback (Q3)
As explained in Chapter 5.5, Pythia can optionally use code coverage feedback to select
only test cases that increase code coverage and prioritize them for further mutations.
When a target service can be instrumented to produce coverage information, Pythia’s
coverage monitor collects this information and selects for further mutations only test
cases that exercise unique code paths Thus, Pythia avoids mutating redundant seeds
that activate identical code paths, and thus, more efficiently increases code coverage.
Table 5.1 shows the total number of new lines executed by Pythia after 24h of
fuzzing each API family without (blackbox) and with (greybox) using code coverage
feedback as well as the respective improvements. We observe that the best percentage
improvement from code coverage feedback is obtained in GitLab’s “Issued & Notes”,
“Groups & Members”, and “Projects” API families (23%, 19%, and 40% respectively).
These improvements are desirable and are more expected in API families with relatively
more requests (see Table 3.1: e.g., 54 for “Projects”) where using code coverage to pri-
oritize test cases (i.e., request combinations) that exercise unique code paths leads
to better improvement. Code coverage also leads to a 17% improvement in Spree’s
Storefront Cart. On the other hand, there is marginal or no improvement in GitLab’s
“Branches” and “Commits” API families that contain relatively less API requests (e.g.,
8 for “Branches”). There is also no improvement in Mastodon’s API families. Partic-
ularly in Mastodon, Pythia’s coverage monitor discovers very few unique basic blocks
activated by the test cases (“32” for “Accounts & Lists” and 4 for “Statuses”), while the
same number ranges in the hundreds of basic blocks for all other API families. Conse-
quently, since the coverage signal is too sporadic, there is no added value when using
coverage feedback in Mastodon. Overall, using code coverage is an optional feature,





Tests 500s Bugs Tests 500s Bugs
Commits 7.3K 0 0 10.7K 132 6
Branches 4.9K 0 0 12.3K 135 3
Issues & Notes 8.1K 0 0 11.1K 246 2
Groups & Mmbrs 9.1K 0 0 15K 234 4
Projects 6.5K 0 0 18.3K 185 3
Repos & Files 7.1K 0 0 14.9K 79 5
Accounts & Lists 10.6K 0 0 63.5K 1307 4
Statuses 26K 336 1 56K 962 2
Storefront Cart 13.7K 2018 1 18.7K 401 4
Total - - 2 - - 33
Table 5.2: New bugs found. Shows the number of test cases generated, “500 Internal
Server Errors” triggered, and new bugs found by RESTler and Pythia after 24h of
fuzzing each API family.
Number of Bugs Found (Q4)
Although code coverage is an indicative proxy to measure the effectiveness of bug
finding tools, the ultimate metric is the number of new bugs found. Pythia finds new
bugs across all the tested APIs. In total, Pythia found 33 new bugs.
During fuzzing, a high number of “500 Internal Server Errors” is usually triggered
by Pythia and different instances of the same bugs may be reported repeatedly. Since
“500 Internal Server Errors” are potential server state corruptions with unknown con-
sequences in the target service health, it is desirable to avoid duplication and report
unique instances of each bug in order to facilitate further manual inspection. We use
code coverage information and group unique bugs according to the following rule: count
as unique bugs the “500 Internal Server Error” instances that emanate from test cases
exercising unique code paths. Nonetheless, if code coverage information is not avail-
able, Pythia can group bugs using the structure of the types of the non-rendered request
sequence (i.e., the same bucketization scheme followed by RESTler).
Table 5.2 compares Pythia with RESTler and shows the total number of test cases
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generated, 500s errors triggered, and unique bugs found after 24h of fuzzing each API
family. To ensure fair comparison between the two tools, Table 5.2 reports results
where Pythia runs in blackbox mode (i.e., without using code coverage feedback). Fur-
thermore, we cross-checked that total number of 2 bugs reported for RESTler remains
the same for all RESTler configurations (including BFS, BFS-Fast, and RandomWalk)
even after fuzzing for 48h.
We observe that Pythia generates more test cases than RESTler across all APIs—
220K versus 93K respectively. This is because Pythia’s learning-based mutations do
not lead to new request sequence combinations. (i.e., constant number of request
per test case). In contrast, RESTler’s mutations continuously increase the number
of requests per test case by appending new requests. Hence, the target service test
case throughput is better for Pythia than for RESTler. Most importantly, we observe
that Pythia’s learning-based mutations trigger 500s across all API families, whereas
RESTler’s mutations trigger 500s only in two API families. Using the bug grouping
rule described earlier, we group Pythia’s 500s to 33 unique bugs. Independently (i.e.,
using its own bug grouping methodology), RESTler also found 2 unique bugs, which
we do not count in the column reported for Pythia.
New Bugs Found
During our experiments with Pythia on local GitLab, Mastodon, and Spree deployments
we found 33 new bugs. All bugs were easily reproducible and were all confirmed by the
respective service owners. We describe a subset of those bugs to give a flavor of what
they look like and what test cases uncovered them.
Example 1: Bug in Storefront Cart. One of the bugs found by Pythia in Spree is
triggered when a user tries to add a product in the storefront cart using a malformed
request path ``/storefront/|add_item?include=line_items''. Due to erroneous
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input sanitization, the character ``|'' is not stripped from the intermediate path
parts. Instead, it reaches the function split of library uri.rfc3986_parser.rb, which
treats it as a delimiter of the path string. This leads to an unhandled InvalidURIError
exception in the caller library actionpack, and causes a “500 Internal Server Error”
preventing the application from handling the request and returning the proper error, i.e.,
“400 Bad Request”. This bug can be reproduced with a test case with two requests: (1)
creating a user token and (2) adding a product in the chart using a malformed request
path. Bugs related to improper input sanitization and unhandled values passed across
multiple layers of software libraries are usually found when using fuzzing. Pythia found
bugs due to malformed request paths in all the services tested.
Example 2: Bug in Issues & Notes. Another bug found by Pythia in GitLab’s
Issues & Notes APIs is triggered when a user attempts to open an issue on an existing
project, using a malformed request body. The body of this request includes multi-
ple primitive types and multiple key-value pairs, including due_date, description,
confidentiality, title, asignee_id, state_event, and others. A user can cre-
ate an issue using a malformed value for the field title, such as {"title":"DELE\xa2"}
which leads to a “500 Internal Server Error”. The malformed title value is not sani-
tized before reaching the fuction create of <class:Issues> that creates new issues.
This leads to an unhandled ArgumentError exception due to an invalid UTF-8 byte
sequence. This bug can reproduced by (1) creating a project and (2) trying to post an
issue with a malformed title in the project created in (1).
Interestingly, adding malformed values in other fields of the request body does not
necessarily lead to errors. For instance, the fields confidentiality and state_event
belong to different primitive types (boolean and integer) which are properly parsed and
sanitized. Furthermore, mutations that corrupt the json structure of the request body
or that do not use existing project ids lead to no such errors. Brute-forcing all possible
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ways to break similar REST API request sequences is infeasible. Instead, Pythia learns
common usage patterns of the target service APIs and then applies learning-based
mutations breaking these patterns and generating many grammatically valid test cases.
Pythia found such input sanitization bugs, due to malformed request bodies, in all
services tested. A similar bug is also shown in Figure 5.1.
Other examples of unhandled errors found by Pythia are due to malformed headers
and request types. All the bugs found during this work are currently being reported
to the respective service owners, and some of those previously-unknown errors have
already been confirmed.
5.7 Summary
Pythia is the first fuzzer that augments grammar-based fuzzing with coverage-guided
feedback and a learning-based mutation strategy for stateful REST API fuzzing. Pythia
uses a statistical model to learn common usage patterns of target REST APIs from
grammatically valid seed inputs. It then generates mutations by injecting a small
amount of noise in the learnt model, causing it to deviate from common usage patterns.
Pythia’s learning-based mutation strategy helps generate new, grammatically valid test
cases and coverage-guided feedback helps prioritize the test cases that are more likely
to find bugs. We presented detailed experimental evidence—collected across three
productions-scale, open-source cloud services—showing that Pythia outperforms prior
approaches both in code coverage achieved and in new bugs found. Pythia found new
bugs in all services tested so far. In total, Pythia found 33 bugs which were all confirmed




Modern cloud services are complex conglomerates: they consist of multiple layers of
software components that are usually written by multiple parties, span different lan-
guages and run-time environments, and continuously interact with each other. This
model of multiple entangled layers of abstraction, which is typical in modern applica-
tions beyond cloud services, inevitably imposes increased complexity with performance,
security, and reliability ramifications [43]. Indeed, many of the bugs discovered in cloud
services in the context of this dissertation were due to invalid inputs that traversed
different layers of abstraction and led to unforeseen errors. A seemingly valid input for
one layer of abstraction, may constitute an invalid input with detrimental consequences
for an underlying layer of abstraction. How to effectively test entire cloud service stacks
for such unforeseen errors is still an open research challenge. This dissertation took a
novel step forward.
We investigated the hypothesis that we can leverage the structured usage of cloud
services through REST APIs and feedback obtained during interaction with such ser-
vices (e.g., in the form of responses and HTTP status codes received or in the form of
service-side code coverage achieved) in order to build systems that test cloud services
in an automatic, efficient, and learning-based way through their APIs.
First, we introduced RESTler, a pioneer system using stateful REST API fuzzing to
test cloud services through their APIs. RESTler statically analyzes the API documen-
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tation of a RESTful cloud service (given in an API specification language, such as Ope-
nAPI [29]) and then generates tests by (1) inferring dependencies among request types,
and by (2) learning invalid request combinations from the service’s past responses.
We presented empirical evidence showing that these two techniques are necessary to
thoroughly test a target cloud service through its REST API, while at the same time
pruning the large search space of possible request sequences. We evaluated various
search strategies on three open-source, production scale cloud services and found tens
of previously-unknown bugs. Moreover, we used RESTler to test four proprietary Azure
and Office365 cloud services, and found several bugs in each of them. All bugs found
by RESTler were confirmed and fixed by the corresponding service owners.
Although these results are encouraging, baseline stateful REST API fuzzing can only
detect the generic class of “500 Internal Server Errors.” Thus, we, then, described how
stateful REST fuzzing can be extended with active checkers capturing desirable REST
API security properties beyond “500 Internal Server Errors.” Specifically, we intro-
duced four security rules that capture desirable properties of REST APIs and services,
and implemented active property checkers that automatically test and detect violations
of these rules. We implemented all active checkers following a modular design and eval-
uated various performance optimizations on three open-source and three proprietary
cloud services. Using active property checkers we reported bugs related to rule viola-
tions of security properties on proprietary Azure and Office365 services, which were all
confirmed and fixed. Our reports were taken seriously by the respective service owners,
since violations of the four security rules were potential security vulnerabilities and it
was safer to fix these bugs rather than risk a live incident with unknown consequences.
Finally, we introduced Pythia, the first fuzzer that augments grammar-based fuzzing
with coverage-guided feedback and a learning-based mutation strategy for stateful
REST API fuzzing. Pythia uses a statistical model to learn common usage patterns of
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target REST APIs from grammatically valid seed inputs. It then generates mutations
by injecting a small amount of noise in the learnt model, causing it to deviate from
common usage patterns. Pythia’s learning-based mutation strategy helps generate new,
grammatically valid test cases and coverage-guided feedback helps prioritize the test
cases that are more likely to find bugs. We presented experimental evidence showing
that Pythia outperforms prior approaches both in code coverage achieved and in new
bugs found. Pythia found new bugs in all services tested so far (33 in total) which were
confirmed by the respective service owners.
Overall, in this dissertation we focused on bugs that were camouflaged behind the
REST APIs of cloud services. This is a new class bugs and unlike buffer overflows
in binary-format parsers, or use-after-free bugs in web browsers, or cross-site-scripting
attacks in web pages, it is still largely unclear how severe these errors are. However,
our work already has significant industrial impact: “Over the last 16 months, RESTler
(including new extensions) has progressively been deployed more broadly inside Mi-
crosoft, and its application directly contributed to finding and fixing several hundred
new bugs in Azure, Office365, and Bing services.” [31]
Our world keeps changing fast. Research organizations, educational institutions,
and other companies are increasingly switching from the complexity of owning and
maintaining their own, on-premise computing infrastructure to instead access and pay
on demand cutting edge cloud technologies. Without a doubt, systems for testing cloud
services will have a broad real-life impact. This dissertation marks a clear path forward
to test cloud services in automatic, efficient, and learning-based way for reliability,
scalability, and performance issues through their APIs.
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